NEW TIMES

March 1992

The spy who couldn't spy

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

The Reds are coming

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RUSSIA AND NEXT DOOR

POLITICAL LIFE *M. Shakina* **HOT SPRING AFTER HARD WINTER** 4

OBSERVER'S VIEW *P. Bayev* **"MINI-BUTTON" FOR KRAVCHUK?** 7

ETHNIC PROBLEMS *K. Isakov*

GERMANS ARE READY TO RETREAT FROM THE VOLGA 8

PROFILE *M. Shakina* **THE RUTSKOI RIDDLE** 9

ESTONIA *M. Levin* **REFUGE FOR THE WRETCHED "MIGRANT"** 13

AZERBAIJAN *G. Kovalskaya* **FAR FROM THE FIGHTING FRONT** 16

PAST AND PRESENT *V. Ignatenko* **FROM VILNIUS TO FOROS** 18

ECONOMICS *L. Mlechin* **THE SAKHALIN EXPERIENCE WARNS: POLITICS IS DANGEROUS FOR BUSINESS** 24

WORLD

JAPAN *S. Butin, V. Ganyuskin* **THE RULING PARTY AND THE PEOPLE** 28

IRAQ *D. Zgersky* **BAGHDAD INFLATED NOT ONLY VINYL CHLORIDE TANKS** 32

CUBA *Ye. Bai* **ON THE BANANA-PEEL DIET** 34

THIRD BASKET

NEW TIMES INVESTIGATES *L. Yelin* **A SPY WHO COULDN'T SPY** 36

MANUSCRIPTS DO NOT BURN *P. Struve* **THE MYSTICISM OF STATE POWER** 41

SCIENCE *P. Berezhnev, V. Tolmachev* **FORTUNE-TELLERS SHOULD SWITCH FROM TEA LEAVES TO THE PERIODIC TABLE** 46

YUGOSLAVIA *G. Sysoyev* **HUSTLERS SPOILING FOR A FIGHT** 48

FROM OUR MAILNAG **(2),** PEOPLE **(44)**

Cover by Victor Brel



Why didn't Gorbachev use his last chance? **p.18**

The mysteries of the Japanese Politburo **p. 28**

Yugoslav prostitues waiting for Russian guys from the UN Force **p.48**

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From our mailbag

■ I read with indignation and surprise a series of Boris Pilyatskin's articles in *Izvestia* about Dieter Gerhard and his wife Ruth, Soviet spies in South Africa, who were arrested in 1983.

Seven years later, the South African President released Ruth, and talks about her husband are being held. Switzerland has freed Ruth from criminal responsibility. She is now employed in a marketing firm, and it could be supposed this ensures her not a bad standard of living.

However, writing about the activity of the spies condescendingly and at times approvingly, Pilyatskin complains that Ruth's standard of living is below the standard accepted in Switzerland. Don't you see, she does not have real estate and a car. The author asks with indignation why Ruth is not helped by those who earlier provided the couple with fashionable clothes and accommodation in five-star hotels. Moreover, he appeals to those who received "invaluable information" from them for many years and states threateningly: "I wish this information would be read in the same department which once made lavish promises to Dieter Gerhard. Let them think whether the devil-may-care, if not treacherous, attitude towards unmasked agents will stimulate those who continue to do secret work today in some countries.

But is it necessary to pay the work of our secret agents, as we did before? Wouldn't it be better to recall them or leave them in peace? It is indeed immoral to provide money and privileges for them at the expense of our impoverished citizens.

Alexei Golub
Moscow

■ It is interesting to watch how *New Times* gives increasing support for Judaism. The publication of articles by such dilettantes as Dmitry Zgersky only helps the nationalists to win more supporters.

In his article "The memory of the Black Hundred" (No. 3/92), Zgersky demonstrates his striking knowledge about the number of patriotic periodicals. However, he knows little about another thing. He writes about Lenin. But Lenin was only 25 percent Russian. One of his grandfathers was a Kalmyk and a serf. The son of this grandfather became a noble, but not a democrat, as Lenin did. He was a monarchist. So Lenin was Judas in his own family. Lenin's Mother Marian (Miriam) Alexandrovna was a daughter of a police doctor Alexander Davidovich Blank (Alexander Dmitrievich after baptism). His grandfather, David Blank, was a druggist in Odessa and a member of a synagogue assembly. Since Zgersky alleges that Lenin's mother and father were Russians, he (Zgersky) is a Communist and a nationalist, moreover a Jewish nationalist.

I am not sure about Brezhnev's nationality. But his face is obviously not Aryan.

Igor Shafarevich calls people like Zgersky Russophobes. The numbers of Russian nationalists will grow. Russians will always remain nationalists, racists and anti-Semites. And your magazine only helps us in this cause.

N. Rosanov
Cherepovets

■ In the articles by progressive intellectuals published in Russian periodicals one can often come across the words "much- suffering Rus." When did Russia suffer and from whom? It suffered from the Mongol-Tartar yoke. But that

The party of survival

■ Dead, calm, vacuum, cemetery. Any of these words will be appropriate to describe the present state of political life in our town. One gets the impression that the struggle between parties and ideas and the forging of political leaders can be observed in any other place but our town in the south of the Moscow region, with a population of 40,000, most of whom are scientific workers.

However, facts are needed to confirm the impression. In the search of exact data I applied to the town Soviet, inquiring whether any political party of socio-political movement has been registered in the town. I received a negative reply. None of the parties formed in the Russsian Federation have set up its local branch in our town. Perhaps they are working underground? Only two years ago there were 3,000 Communists here. Where are they now? It's true that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its previous form has been banned. However, conditions for the propaganda of communist ideas are quite favourable. The law allows the pluralism of ideas, and capitalism is advancing. So it's time to act, and they are acting in some places. Nina Andreyeva organized a congress of the All-Union Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*); Denisov, of the Socialist Party of Working People; Prigarin, of the League of Communists; Tyulkin, of the Russian Communist Workers' Party; Kryuchkov, of the Russian Party of Communists. They are all Communist parties, and each of them alleges that it is the truly Communist one. There are also Democrats led by Travkin, Liberals led by Kasparov, Republicans headed by Lysenko, Free Russians by Rutskoi, monarchists, anarchists and many others. Having some experience of party work in the past and personally knowing many local activists of the former ruling party, I tried to discover signs of party life through personal contacts.

Former party officials were the first to whom I applied. There were about ten full-time party workers in our town. Having experienced a double blow – presidential decrees and attempts to get a new job – they are adapting themselves to the new situation and therefore do not care about parties. Then I talked with former activists of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Only a year ago the platform excited the minds of party orthodoxes. Some of them, myself included, tried to democratize the

Brezhnev: his face is obviously not Aryan

Helping nationalists win more supporters?

Russians suffer through their own fault



Drawing by Marat Tairov

was centuries ago. Is Great Rus still unable to heal the wounds inflicted by the Mongol yoke? What about hundreds of nationalities conquered by Russia herself? Were they not created by God?

The Russians have suffered from time immemorial through their own fault, because they often elected fools as their leaders. In the course of their history they have often been saved by representatives of other peoples – Great Timur, Bagration, Barklai-de-Tolly and, finally (I wish him good luck), Ruslan Khasbulatov, the current Chairman of the Russian Parliament.

Nasyrzhon Rasulov
Ferghana Region

■ In his article "'Kalinka' in Jerusalem" (No. 5/92), Nikolai Shishlin writes: "I can't help feeling bitter about thousands of people leaving this country." If the author does feel bitter on this occasion, let me ask him: what did he do as a political analyst to prevent this exodus? For many years millions of people have watched Shishlin on TV and listened to him over the radio. He should know the situation better. Shishlin visited Israel and saw the real state of affairs with his own eyes. So let him write about the bitter truth. However, instead, he wrote an article about the Kalinka song company's concerts abroad. You will agree that we are tired of articles on this subject.

He would do better to write about engineers who work as dish-washers, doctors working as yard-keepers, about prostitution and suicides in Israel. Many of those who want to change their place of residence would then think whether or not to emigrate. Such an article is simply necessary, because the exodus of Jews to Israel in no way helps settle the Middle East conflict.

V. Krivulin
Moscow

■ We would like to join in the discussion with your readers on the army of Vlasov.

Not all Vlasovites were traitors. Many of them, faint with hunger and back-breaking labour in camps, were ready to follow anyone in order to survive. Recruitment into the Russian Liberation Army under Vlasov's command was accompanied, on the one hand, by intensive Goebbels propaganda and on the other hand, by the propaganda of Vlasovites, who claimed that they were fighting not against the people, but against the "hated Stalinist regime." Those who refused to serve in the Liberation Army were questioned and beaten. Then, with the sanction of Vlasov himself, they were executed. Executions in the Russian Liberation Army continued even after the surrender of Nazi Germany.

The Vlasov Army was gladly joined by those who hated Communists and the Soviet government. They hoped to liquidate the existing system with the help of Nazi Germany. Dmitry Sergeyevich, whose letter you published, was one such person. It is interesting why he decided to show his true face today. He lies by saying that Vlasovites killed only Communists. Did they check whether a victim had a party card?

When your magazine was established, it bore the title *War and the Working Class*. This was in 1943, when the Soviet people had achieved a radical change in the course of the war. Could anyone think then that many years after the magazine, renamed *New Times*, would risk publishing a letter from a real fascist?

I.Savarov, M. Sviridenko
Novosibirsk

***Compiled by* Tatiana Chernova**

CPSU in the form of the Rutskoi-led party even before the coup attempt. I did not notice any desire on their part to continue their political activity.

My conclusion is that this party of Russian ex-Communists did not find ways of expressing the social needs of anyone but former party bureaucrats, who are now vying for posts in the central apparatus, close to the energetic party leader. All this virtually ruined the Vice-President's idea of establishing a new mass party.

Perhaps the Marxist Platform was more lucky. I made a couple of phone calls, and, as befits the man who knows the strength of the true teaching, my acquaintance, a "Marxist," told me without doubt about regular meetings in Moscow, the distribution of newspapers, and the collection of signatures in defence of the Kurile islands from the Japanese yoke. In short, there are ideas, and some concrete political work is conducted. However, there is simply no time for registering a local organization. Incidentally, two of the above-mentioned parties have been formed by the breakaway "Marxists." True, a little additional opinion poll did not confirm signs of the activity of any primary organization. But this apparently is not necessary. In general, in the Marxist doctrine, and especially practice, we engaged in wishful thinking so much that we finally lost the sense of reality.

Thus, my attempts to see manifestations of multiparty life proved unsuccessful. It turned out that our provincial town does not need a carte blanche for the activity of new parties. People keep away from those who, to use the words of a poet, want "the magnificent word – party – to shine again." It is impossible to entice them into any party by any promises.

But perhaps the people have made their choice. In conditions of the collapsing state-run economy and political disarray they have preferred the only but truly mass party – the party of their kitchen-garden, country house, flat, car and family. And they are probably right. It is necessary to survive.

G. Dernovoi
Protvino, Moscow Region

POLITICAL LIFE

Hot spring after hard winter

Drawing by Marat Tairov

What agitates the public in this politically highly eventful month of March are the convention of has-beens, the Tatarstan referendum and Ukrainian nuclear warheads...

Marina Shakina

This year of 1992 will apparently be "decisive." Indeed, the last few weeks at any rate indicate that many political processes in Russia and in the CIS generally are moving to a head. Russians, only just accustomed to the new prices, stand stockstill in expectation of more price hikes on oil, coal, petrol, gas and electricity. While Boris Yeltsin holidayed in Sochi, the Vice-President demonstrated the resolution long-expected of the President. Thus his part in the hostages affair plus his declaration that the Army must be pulled out of the Transcaucasus as soon as possible and that officer families be immediately evacuated definitely jacked up his rating generally, not only in the armed forces.

In the meantime blood is shed in the Dniester area, the Karabakh war drags on and a Georgian "government in exile" has been formed in Chechen. Yet, the public are concerned more with three other issues, notably, the "sixth extraordinary congress of people's deputies of the USSR," the Tatarstan sovereignty referendum and the new round in the political game between Russia and Ukraine, more specifically, Kravchuk's suspension of the evacuation of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine.

"Before the eyes of the bloodthirsty police"

The clamour around the "congress of has-beens" and the popular assemblage on Manezh (why don't the has-beens still call it the "Fiftieth Anniversary of October Square"?) started long before March 17.

What activists of the Tatar Public Centre think of Tatarstan's secession from Russia is clear. What do others there think?

ITAR-TASS photo

Indeed, the February 23 meeting with bruised and battered faces in police-cordoned downtown of Moscow struck a forté overture. To be sensed is the hand of a mastermind with a definitely theatrical bent, as even such titles as "The march of the hungry lines" and the "Procession of empty pots and pans" betoken leaning towards extravaganza.

Will the meeting be allowed or not? What will Moscow Mayor Popov say? And what will Moscow police chief Murashov do? The has-beens have already chalked up a few points thanks to such inadvertent advertisements, amplified moreover, by mysterious announcements that the aforementioned congress will take place in any political weather at 10 a.m. sharp on Tuesday, but where we do not know, as the has-beens are reluctant to specify. In short, the USSR MPs have glamourized themselves as a harassed underground movement despite their having already pasted up all over Moscow audacious leaflets that say, for instance, "Come all against a sheep-like existence." We see that they have enough resources to this end. The staging has whipped up curiosity. Yet these are only props. What about the play itself? How to qualify attempts to convene the congress of people's deputies of the no longer existing USSR?

The organizers themselves are long aware that the USSR has gone and will not be brought back. So what do they seek to achieve? After all, they cannot seriously believe anyone will obey the decisions of this so-called congress? Is this a provocaiton? Or a touted spectacle, serving to tickle the nerves by means of the sideshow, termed "the convocation of the sixth congress of people's deputies of the USSR before the very eyes of the bloodthirsty Moscow police and the freedom-throttling democrats"? The latter, we presume. A political gamble to jack up the ratings of the movement as a whole and of its individual leaders, where personal ambitions overshadow ideology. Even the brainiest could not tell inquisitive journalists whether they had any rational tangible political objectives and plans. They have no positive programme.

Yet they scared Moscow City Hall. Though Luzhkov banned the meeting, Moscow Police chief Murashov did not approve the ban. Meanwhile Mayor Popov came out with a statement implying that "The *Bolsheviks* will not pass!" He was so intolerant that many faces of his supporters fell. After all, it was thought he would show wisdom. Hence, Ruslan Khasbulatov "stamped his feet."

The entire sequence was indeed farcical and evidently Golik, Kraiko, Makashov et al are happy with their newly-gained popularity as hardly a day passed without an interview in the most prestigious newspapers, or a paragraph concerned with the coming congress.

Meanwhile Russia's Procurator' Office frowned qualifying these designs as an attempted coup. Which was only to be expected. However, the city fathers should have been cleverer. Why not treat the meeting as a nostalgic display, as a club gathering? Why not let the ex-MPs congregate and recall the good old days if they so want? Why not let them speak out and promote the USSR, as after all, we do have royalists advocating the pre-revolutionary Russian empire? Why, we can even expect to find admirers of the Roman empire or of the duchy of Muscovy.

The bad side is that as public opinion polls show, part of the population take this at face value. They are mostly elderly folk, who devoted all their lives to former USSR and who now have nothing to show for it. It is to them the leaders of the erstwhile USSR appeal, though they very well know that they will never be able to bring that USSR back.

Court ruling

Another highlight is the Tatarstan referendum slated for March 21. The question put is: "Do you want Tatarstan to be a sovereign state and a subject of international law whose relations with Russia and other states would be governed by equal treaties?" The wording is rather hazy. The referendum is being openly pushed through, evidently to have it over and done with before the impending Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, that in all likelihood will enact a new constitution.

Only two years ago Yeltsin's audacious statement to "take as much sovereignty as is wanted" was made in Tatarstan during the Centre-Russia and Yeltsin-Gorbachev confrontation. This won Russia the sympathies of the republics, with Tatarstan's leaders taking it literally. No wonder, as that time was keynoted by the democratic fervour of Democratic Russia with democrat Yeltsin's nationalities policy being precisely of that order. Tatarstan at once got the ball rolling, declaring sovereignty yet back in 1990. Russia's Parliament kept mum. Next came a law claiming precedence for

Tatarstan's Constitution over that of the Russian Federation. Moreover, deleted from it was the paragraph qualifying Tatarstan as part of Russia. Again Russia's Parliament kept mum. However, Russia's democrats could not stomach the idea of the referendum.

A group of MPs and Russia's Parliament generally appealed to the Constitutional Court. Shelving all other affairs, though it has much on its plate, including a request to consider the edict abolishing the CPSU, this body examined the issue and found the wording unconstitutional. It was reported that Tatarstan leaders respected the court ruling and modified the wording to now read: "Do you want Tatarstan to be a sovereign republic?"

However, from other sources we learnt that the referendum may be postponed.

A couple of days later came another exchange, with Tatarstan legalizing the equality of all its nationalities and ethnic units, and all the republics, except for Checheno-Ingushetia and Tatarstan, initialling in Moscow the draft of a federal treaty. Which implies that the coming congress of Russia's people's deputies will most likely enact a new constitution.

Metamorphosing politicians

The curious metamorphoses politicians undergo from time to time have long been noted. In confrontation with the unitarian Centre and empire Moscow they all preached the sacrosanct principle of self-determination. But once having achieved secession they now preach the principle of indivisibility. Neither Kravchuk, Landsbergis, Snegur, Mutalibov, Yeltsin, nor Nazarbayev were immune. Shaimiev will follow suit should Tatarstan secede. It would be futile to see this as Janus-faced inconsistency, as a departure from the principles of democracy. This is politics, reality.

The two principles of self-determination and indivisibility are recorded in international documents. However, to this day international law has yet to say which comes first. The laws that govern the emergence of new states are also largely a mystery. States do not clearly pop up at someone's particular bidding. However, the world knows that an ethnos is no state.

The principle of self-determination operates, provided certain factors exist. Only common sense imposes a restriction. Thus would Bashkirs or Russians be entitled to self-determination within Tatarstan? Or suppose one or another town there held a referendum, for instance, to join Japan? True, some democrats still believe all nationalities and ethnic units are entitled to statehood regardless of number and compactness of residence. Has anyone seriously totted up, not in a speculative way, but with an eye to political circumstances and the specifics of our rather uncivilized mentality, the consequences ensuing from such fragmentation? Would this not spell the "war of everyone against everyone"?

In the two years since Russia's parliamentary elections and Yeltsin's audacious statement on sovereignty, the entire country has observed the tragic developments in Karabakh, the Dniester region and Chechen. The so-called state-minded have gathered strength in Parliament and the Democratic Russia movement.

Enclave

If the majority in Tatarstan approve of the sovereignty at the referendum that will give this republic's leaders the trump card of legitimacy for secession from Russia. In the view of one Tatarstan VIP, then Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other countries could recognize the republic. Meanwhile Tatarstan's parliamentary speaker is convinced that it is too late for Russia to include the republic in its federation. He sees the present relationship as a federation, even as an association.

A public opinion survey in Kazan shows that 65 percent of the people interviewed are convinced that the referendum would impair inter-ethnic relationship in the republic. Clearly elsewhere in Russia, Russian-Tatar relationships would not improve. Four out of every five Tatars live outside of Tatarstan. Moscow's influential Tatar community, which forged ahead during *perestroika,* advocates religious tolerance and national conciliation.

Tatarstan's leaders say they want sovereignty because the Russian Moscow still dictates like the old Centre Moscow. They claim that nothing has changed. Kazan is rushing to push through the referendum before the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia convenes to adopt a new Constitution and a federative treaty, envisaging the division of power between the federal government and constituent republics, with the latter granted most favoured nation treatment. Hence to argue that Moscow dictates is invalid.

Though heading towards a rupture with Russia, Tatarstan's leaders oddly claim that secession from Russia and a national army and a national currency are out of question. They apparently do not want to scare either their own population or Russia and see to go ahead but gradually.

This is not at all horrifying. The question should actually be thrashed out among all parties concerned, inasmuch as one-sided actions, attempts to face political partners with a *fait accompli* are rather risky.

Baker to come again

Ukraine has an analogous problem. A Crimean referendum may take place any day now. Which presents still more of a tangle than Tatarstan, as there did exist before a Crimean republic, which has yet to be restored, In 1954, in the upshot of what some sources call a rather dubious juridical procedure, the Crimea was handed over to Ukraine, and based in the Crimea is the Black Sea Navy, that apple of discord between the two largest CIS founder republics.

The trump cards both Russia and Ukraine hold, are the Crimea, oil, the Navy, timber, nuclear waste, coupons and Russia's Germans. Added recently was President Kravchuk's "grapeshot" decision to retain nuclear weapons. The Americans are to be pitied: Baker will again have to shuttle around CIS capitals.

Only recently Kiev was coaxed into footing part of the bill for the USSR's external debt. Kravchuk's current nuclear announcement definitely takes the cake. What he expects to achieve may see the light of day at the Kiev CIS summit.

Will that summit be the CIS's last, as some think?

"Mini-button" for Kravchuk?

Ukraine's strategy of escalating the conflict with Russia is by no means due to any wicked design on the part of Leonid Kravchuk. An experienced politician, he well realizes that he will stay in the saddle only by demonstrating day in, day out his fidelity to independent statehood, and stealing a march on the leaders of the RUKH movement. Distancing from Russia is conceivable only through more conflicts, as otherwise, the natural appeal the two peoples have for one another, will take over. But as the nuclear issue appears to be so much of a convenient lever for pump-priming mistrust and tension, one wonders why Kravchuk did not play this card before.



Pavel Bayev

In all likelihood the delay was primarily due to the Army's unreliability. Only after having had the bulk of the troops in the three military areas take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine did Kiev feel more or less sure of itself. It was now convinced that the generals in command having lost control would be unable to display any real force. There is likewise a pro forma excuse for suspending the evacuation of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine. This is Russia's failure to meet commitments, as regards the destruction of nuclear munitions that due to the lack of facilities are simply stored up.

The said pretext, as well as the argument that nuclear weaponry might land in the "wrong hands" do not appear convincing, which the West at once noted. However, I think the various external factors along with the recent entreaties of James Baker and Manfred Wörner to show nuclear commonsense will not decide the Ukrainian leader. Thanks to the "non-nuclear pause" Kiev managed to secure overall recognition and step out into the international arena. However, it believes exiomatic the need of force to play a role on the international scene. Such political provincialism is rather dangerous than oldfashioned, as far as force goes the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not so meaningful as a nuclear status.

One feels obliged to note that Russia's policies or rather actions signally contributed to Kiev's promotion of a nuclear line.

As I see it, the desire to transfer de facto to Russia's "jurisdiction" the Defence Ministry and general staff of the former USSR behind a thinly veiled attempt to represent them as the Commonwealth's "common possession" was a political miscalculation of a most serious order. For had CIS stood in need of integrated military structures such structures should have been created on the basis of parity. Further, should Russia want to have its own military department this office must be civilian, competent and compact. Though these two aspects are called for, the currently operating Defence Ministry is certainly not up to the mark, being in no position to discharge either function.

Ukraine wants to stay in "nuclear club"

Though President Yeltsin displayed courage and political intuition by staking on a team of young professional economists, unfortunately, he has not been able thus far to come up with a similar team to cope with the web of military intrigue. It would be fine could he make up for lost time in one go, but the fair is already over. Now one may easily predict that the suddenly detonated "nuclear bomb" will blow up the entire package of accords on military matters at the CIS summit in Kiev.

In all likelihood Kravchuk will announce adherence to a non-nuclear status, play up of multilateral inspection and push phased control. As it is virtually impossible to restructure strategic command, Kiev will evidently haggle. At any rate, though costly, a "mini-button" controlling several hundred tactical warheads is feasible.

We may hear in the foreseeable future that the garrison of some nuclear installation in Ukraine has "volunteered" to deposit its armament into Mister Kravchuk's "kind hands."

I feel an itch to proclaim Cassandra-like that but half a year back I warned of Ukraine's nuclear ambitions, only to be showered with brickbats. In effect, though, it was easy enough to predict this as, at issue were not runaway feelings and political outpourings but a cooly calculated long-term strategy, that would integrate nuclear armament sooner or later.

Germans are ready to retreat from the Volga

They will go to the Rhine or the Elbe. Will that make Russians happy?

Only recently have the regional Saratov and Volgograd leaders celebrated a "region-wide victory" over Russian Germans. The former party functionaries, now occupying the chairs of state public servants, managed not only to incite the local population against this ethnic group, but also to ensure the support of Russia's President. Yeltsin promised the local patriots not to restore the German Autonomous Republic till Germans made up the overwhelming majority of 90 percent of the population on the Volga river banks (before WWII they made 66.4 percent of population of their republic.)

Now Germans seem to have been completely defeated on all Russian fronts. The question of withdrawal from the agenda of the strategic objective of their movement – the restoring of an autonomous republic on the Volga – will be proposed to the second conference of Germans of the former USSR due to open in Moscow on March 20.

A year ago if a person had mentioned something of the kind, Germans would have called him a traitor of the national idea, an apostate who has lost the memory of his forefathers' tombs. For decades many Germans sacrificed their careers, private life, health and freedom in the name of this idea with which national and political rehabilitation of the people was connected. Even when they were given the possibility to leave the country almost freely, the hope to return to the Volga made many refrain from emigration.

Now Germans seem ready to retreat from the Volga. More than that, their leaders intend to demand that Russian and German governments ensure emigration of all who so desire in 3 or 4 years. According to the assessments by experts of the Russian parliament, it may be a matter of 5 to 6 million people, or even of 12 million people in the future (counting mixed marriages.)

Chairman of the Interstate Council for the Rehabilitation of Germans of the former USSR Heinrich Grout cites 20 points of "the years-long scenario of the Union and Russian authorities aimed at the destruction of the strategic objective of Russian Germans," the result of which is "the total desire to emigrate." Although the existence of a scenario opposing German authonomy doesn't seem plausible, the facts mentioned by Heinrich Grout are indicative of a long-standing phenomenon of Union and Russian policy – paying lip-service to a problem while either doing nothing to solve it or further aggravating it, deliberately or otherwise.

Two years ago the CPSU Central Committee inculcated in the German movement the idea of cultural autonomy, having offered the more obedient and complaisant national leaders ministerial portfolios in a government without a state or a territory in exchange for the renunciation of autonomy on the Volga. Then followed the arrest by the KGB of Alfred Scholenberg, Heinrich Grout's economic assistant and a Siberian merchant. (See *NT* issues Nos 44/90, 1/91 and 30/91). Germans saw political motives in the KGB actions. These suspicions are corroborated by the trial which has lasted for half a year already. In April 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev signed the decree to award the members of the so-called Labour Army with medals embossed with... Stalin's portrait. To receive this medal, a Russian German must produce evidence of his "bona fide" labour beyond the barbed wire of the GULAG. Added to this is the Soviet government's opposition to the convening of the first conference of Germans last March and the attempts to split the German national movement, as well as Yeltsin's proposal to resettle Germans in Far Eastern regions or on the territory of a former rocket test site...

All these awkward and ill-thought out actions stirred up a so furiously negative reaction by Germans, that now they no longer trust anyone or anything and refuse to discuss their problems with Russia's authorities at all.

The years-belated decree of the Russian President to the effect of creating an ethnic German area, or district on the Volga, can hardly expedite the restoring of the republic as well as the solution of the German question in Russia, because Germans insist not simply on being given a plot of land near the river, but on restoring to them all they once had.

Leaders of the German movement are inclined to regard Boris Yeltsin's decree as Russia's desire not to miss the allowance granted by Germany for the restoring of the republic and as a response to the initiative of the Ukrainian government. President Kravchuk declared that Ukraine was prepared to restore the historical justice vis-à-vis Ukrainian Germans exiled to Siberia and Kazakhstan. The republic found areas in its four southern regions to build compact German settlements there. Kravchuk also supported the idea of creating a Ukrainian-German fund, intending to add another 500 million rubles to the 5 millions already allocated. The package of Ukrainian initiatives produced a positive impression in Germany, and Kiev's expectations of financial aid from Germany are not ungrounded.

In all evidence, the Ukrainian programme and migration to the Kaliningrad (former Königsberg) region is all that former Soviet Germans who haven't yet made up their mind to leave for Germany, but who fear mounting nationalism in Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, can still hope for.

Germans no longer threaten Russia. Vivat?

Konstantin Isakov

The Volga patriots in the Moscow streets

Photo by the author

The Rutskoi riddle

Marina Shakina



Drawing by Igor Smirnov

General Rutskoi continues to attract public attention: one minute he calls the ministers "boys in pink shorts," at another he demands to proclaim a state of economic emergency or to pardon the putschists. He arouses irritation in democratic ranks. The press watches his escapades with pleasure and places his pronouncements alongside with political scandals.

The relationship of Russia's President with his Vice-President excites even the inert curiosity of the West. At a press conference in the United Nations early last February, Western journalists asked Yeltsin's Press Secretary Pavel Voshchanov, among others, the following question: how are Rutskoi's attacks on the Russian President's government to be interpreted? "Of course, it's not quite normal," began Voshchanov with a subtle smile, and they nodded understandingly since they heard what they had expected to. Unlike the West, we know very well that nothing can ever be normal in our country, and the Vice-President and the history of his political career are no exception to the rule.

"I'll tell you tenderly..."

Rutskoi's rise occurred within six months, if not quicker. Most people's attention was first drawn to him by his speech delivered at the third session of Russia's Supreme Soviet in the middle of January last year. The session gathered a few days after the sanguinary events in Vilnius. Alexander Rutskoi's three-minute-long speech was too passionate to sound parliamentary-like. "Who can guarantee that tomorrow we are not going to see tanks on the Moskva River embankment in front of Russia's Parliament?" asked delegate Rutskoi prophetically. He was also remembered for his repeating every now and then, evidently because of excitement, "I'll tell you tenderly." He dropped this habit later, at least in his public appearances...

It was the first time when a Soviet Army Colonel Rutskoi – far from a disgraced one but, on the contrary, in his full grace, i.e., a conservative by definition, the founder of the society *Otechestvo* (Fatherland) with a national-patriotic reputation – spoke in unison with democrats, the major political force supporting Boris Yeltsin. Why?

When Rutskoi became Vice-President letters from his former fellow servicemen began to be published in which they expressed their surprise at his democratic convictions – nothing of the sort had been observed during the years of his active service. By no means could the Soviet Army have brought up a democrat – the very assumption sounded like an insult to it. However, Boris Yeltsin himself, developed as a politician, being a party functionary, had no source to draw the spirit of democracy from, yet he became a democratic leader. Yeltsin had been prompted by his unyielding temperament which brought him in conflict with the Politburo and Gorbachev. And what about Rutskoi? In all evidence, his is a different case. The Soviet Union still existed in January 1991, and its authorities were, in a way, enemies of Russia's leaders. And in January of last year Russia's dignity and fate were at stake...

Is it possible to be No. 1 while occupying the secondary position?

Two months later, at the third extraordinary session of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation

in March last year, Rutskoi announced the creation of a new parliamentary faction called Communists for Democracy.

"I saw a sincere man who displayed a rather good mastery of public speaking – almost a charismatic leader," recollects one of the founders of the Democratic Party of Russia's Communists later renamed Free Russia Party and commonly known as Rutskoi's party. "And since I had for two or three years constantly thought about ways to reform the CPSU and get rid of conservatives, I realized right away that Rutskoi could become our banner."

But why did these people choose no one other than Rutskoi?

Speaking two languages

Rutskoi combined in his person the features of a traditionalist – a person belonging to the conservative military milieu, a colonel with war experience (he had fought in the unpopular Afghan war, was wounded, escaped from captivity – i.e. fulfilled his duty as soldier), a CPSU member, a patriot – with a tendency for democratic values, or more precisely, with a tendency to support Yeltsin. People were also impressed by his personal qualities – braveness combined with prudence (he didn't hesitate to challenge the faction Communists of Russia, he stayed with the CPSU until the Communists expelled him from the Party), emotional impact, energy. Plus his attractive appearance of an almost legendary hero of old.

And yet, all this is not enough. A "highbrow" intellectual can't become a leader in our country. Rutskoi had something akin to Yeltsin – he was perceived by the people as one of them, practically a man in the street who spoke the same language as they did and did not hesitate to say outright exactly what he thought. This is why his popular support, far from being undermined, was only strengthened by all the non-parliamentary expressions Rutskoi afforded in official situations – they created the impression of ingenuousness, honesty and thirst for justice. Certainly, a refined intellectual may call it a lack of education, but ninety-nine percent of our population can boast of precisely such an education.

Rutskoi is impulsive, impressionable, able to quickly grasp an idea, but soon grows indifferent to it. He is quick to make decisions. He doesn't like to concentrate on something for a long time, for instance, he can't work over documents for longer than 20 minutes. Rutskoi is said to be utterly unable to understand people's characters, tending to overestimate them, especially at the early stages of acquaintance. At different points in his political career he was influenced by different people – Profs Pugachev and Vodolazov, Major-General Stolyarov, now replaced by others.

Rutskoi is extremely emotional, which is not an advantage for a politician who must be impartial and sort of estranged in the interests of his business. In order to feel well, he needs an estimation of his actions by outsiders, indifference hurting him most. He is inconsistent in associating with other people, depends on his mood and he can say entirely different things about the same person in his presence and in his absence, not infrequently with the same people as witnesses.

Rutskoi is extremely efficient – he can work 18 hours a day. He picks up new knowledge quickly, engages in self-education. Some assert that he drinks little (?!). He doesn't accept bribes, but yields to flattery.

The key question: is he intelligent? Many – mostly intellectual democrats – are not inclined to overestimate the Vice-President's intellectual potential. However, it is necessary to note, for the justice's sake, that there is not a single politician, even one of little prominence, who is not considered a rather dull person.

People who know him and work with him say that Rutskoi is no doubt a very capable person – two Military Academy diplomas with awards. He is perceptive, quickly grasps anything, but is easily influenced –

The Vice-President's leading role in the Gorbachev rescue operation in Foros has never been questioned, though quite a few people took part in it

Photo from the magazine Paris-Match (France)

indirectly. For all that, Rutskoi wants to look an independent politician unyielding to external influences. This weakness has long been noticed and will doubtless be used, if not already used. It was overlooked by people from Yeltsin's circle when they sought a vice-president for their boss.

As to the width of his shoulders...

The idea of making Rutskoi the Vice-president is said to belong to Gennady Burbulis. The situation on the eve of elections was such that Democrats were not confident in Yeltsin's victory. The right choice of Vice-President could be an excellent backing. Rutskoi was chosen as a third attempt – proposals were first made to Bakatin and Sobchak.

As it turned out later, Rutskoi was a present made to Yeltsin by providence itself: he was military (the Army's votes), a democratically-minded Communist (votes of rank-and-file communists who did not hold Yeltsin in high esteem because he was a "defector), an Afghan veteran (the Afghan veterans' votes), and a gallant handsome man (female votes). And, as some probably believed, he would feel honoured by Yeltsin's proposal and would be greatful to him till the end of his days. The design proved only partly correct...

The mistake, in all evidence, was that by that time Rutskoi was already a rising political star, and "created" not at all by Yeltsin, at that. Rutskoi had organized the all-Union Communist movement, Civil Concord, he had already tasted popularity. His activity in the field of Communist reformism made him one of the founders of the Movement for Democratic Reforms, bringing him into company with Alexander Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Anatoly Sobchak and other well-known politicians. Rutskoi's close association with these authoritative figures, the architects of *perestroika,* was bound to highten his self-esteem. Some even say that it "got to his head."

Those who have known him closely say that Rutskoi's ambitions were not too high at first. He readily accepted Yeltsin as the leader, as his superior and commander. He even promised Yeltsin that he would never leave him and would remain with him to the end. (However, whether Yeltsin had ever wanted a pledge of allegiance from him remains a mystery.)

Rutskoi's attitude towards Yeltsin was formed, in all evidence, under the influence of a number of factors. First, Yeltsin's charisma whose influence is felt by many in this country; second, the purely military habit of supporting the commander. Third, Rutskoi even physiologically is closer to the President than many of the latter's comrades-in-arms. The sturdy and broad-shouldered President is a head higher than others in any audience and, as affirmed by professionals, suppresses many purely psychologically, while General Rutskoi is only insignificantly second to Yeltsin as far as his height and width of shoulders are concerned.

Rutskoi intended to become Yeltsin's right hand, but Yeltsin planned differently...

Photo by ITAR-TASS

Not in the shadow

The three putsch days made Rutskoi a hero. It was precisely his role – that of the chief organizer of the defence of the House of Parliament, courageous and capable of preserving sang-froid in any critical situation. Fate made him a present – a chance to demonstrate his resolution and fearlessness to the entire world. He was sent to Foros to rescue the USSR President from captivity.

The Foros adventure couldn't avoid influencing his self-appreciation. Soon after the putsch, Rutskoi said that "his fingers were itching to put the government in order."

What was Yeltsin's attitude towards his double? In all evidence, it was friendly indifference at first. It was obviously modesty that Yeltsin expected from him after the elections. President Yeltsin is an experienced politician, a prudent but imperious person who has already grown accustomed to his charisma and unquestionable popularity. It's clear that he is not inclined to tolerate, in close proximity, a new political star capable of outshining his image. Both the President and his retinue understand that Rutskoi greatly resembles his boss, being "a simple chap on the street," incorruptible and harsh, what is more, stately, young (aged 44), and energetic. Will one want such a double after the elections?

The President is too prominent and not a very accessible figure, and Rutskoi found himself mostly in the company of his retinue. He failed to settle his relations with these people. Rutskoi evidently imagined himself the second person after Yeltsin by virtue of his office and intended to tackle all matters together with him. For that reason he treated Yeltsin's team, which had already been formed by the time, rather unceremoniously, as some eyewitnesses affirm.

Yeltsin's team, in turn, decided right away to show Rutskoi his place: he was allotted a team of only six and granted the right of deliberative vote. "From the very start they began pushing him aside – hautily, arrogantly and cynically," asserts one of the eyewitnesses.

The whole history of the Chechen crisis remains a mystery even to this day. Although it was not Rutskoi who signed the decree about the imposition of a state of emergency in the Chechen Republic; although he was not alone to advocate and prepare these measures, parliament's and the press's indignation at the awkwardness of the Russian leaders showered down on General Rutskoi. Can this be explained by the Vice-President's undue energy and lack of restraint? The latter displayed frenetic initiative in that situation, although he entirely lacked diplomatic experience – he visited the city of Grozny where he met with the Chechen leader and the Ingushes. The Supreme Soviet cancelled the decree, the President consented to it unconditionally, and appeals were made to Rutskoi to resign. This led some to believe that it had been the first serious "backlash" against Rutskoi. A couple of months later, in December, the controversies between Rutskoi and Yeltsin's team came to the surface, de-

veloping into a confrontation between him and Burbulis. During his visit to Siberia, Rutskoi publicly expressed his disagreement with the policy of the reform cabinet, calling the ministers "boys in pink shorts." These became wide-spread words. Incidentally, Ruslan Khasbulatov did the same, though in different words. Unlike obstinate Rutskoi; he reformulated his pronouncement, saying that it was a well-meaning, loyal and natural criticism.

The test by agriculture

His relations with the Cabinet and with Burbulis leave much to be desired at present, the Vice-President is looking like a bully again. The first Vice-Premier having demonstrated his patience to the whole world, answered Rutskoi only recently, after a long pause, with a sympathy mixed with a jeer: "For all the pain Rutskoi exudes, for all my human sympathy for him as a man and a citizen, I think that the time is approaching when Alexander Vladimirovich will have to take sides."

Rutskoi can't avoid being hurt by lack of attention from Yeltsin – the Vice-President is even deprived of his weekly hour with the President, which other members of the latter's retinue are granted. They meet rather infrequently, communicating mostly by phone. Yeltsin stopped greeting Rutskoi after his Siberian trip, deprived him of all functions, leaving him practically isolated. This only resulted in Rutskoi starting to give rather outspoken interviews on any occasion, to express his views in printed articles in *Pravda* and other newspapers and to gain popularity. He began to acquire a halo of a fighter and a martyr, like Yeltsin himself did in his time. The President seemed to understand that by sending Rutskoi in exile he ran the risk of making a second Yeltsin out of Rutskoi, just like Yeltsin himself had been one time created by Gorbachev.

After the portentous meeting of the two leaders, Rutskoi looked all go and smiling. He was given a new assignment – agriculture.

President Yeltsin, wearing a stern mien, explained to journalists that it was a very responsible job. Let it be done by this energetic person. Everyone saw in this an overt desire of the President to remove Rutskoi out of his sight. What good can General Rutskoi do for agriculture? It is precisely the domain where no success is possible today. Rutskoi will fail, which is exactly the thing expected. As usual, Rutskoi got down to this job with energy and enthusiasm, eardeep in agricultural problems. Another enthusiastic soldier of the revolution at the government's service? Just to think what the destiny of Russia's agriculture sometimes depend on...

They're surrounding the General

Today the composition of the Vice-President's team is undergoing a reshuffle. Here are a few of the most prominent figures of Rutskoi's circle. His adviser, a lawyer and an economist Valentin Perfiliev, who met Rutskoi at one of the first pre-election rallies. Together with the General he took part in the organization of the Democratic Party of Russia's Communists. He's been recently appointed Rutskoi's agricultural adviser. Vasili Lipitsky, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), is Rutskoi's party's second leader; he was against Rutskoi's participation in the Congress of Civic and Patriotic Forces.

Alexei Tsaregorodtsev, Chief of the Secretariat, who for many years worked together with Boris Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk, has left Rutskoi's team recently. A KGB general Alexánder Sterligov was once among Rutskoi's advisers. Andrei Fyodorov, adviser for foreign relations and Russia's former Deputy Foreign Minister, a young and efficient functionary, who is becoming increasingly influential. He is said to have supported Rutskoi's decision to make an appearance and deliver a speech at the Congress of Civic and Patriotic Forces. Not so long ago a new person emerged in the Vice-President's retinue – economic adviser Vladimir Kuzmin, a former lecturer at Plekhanov Institute of Economics. Rutskoi's Press Secretary Nikolai Gulbinsky worked at one time at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee as a scholar of Trotsky's heritage. He created the new party together with the Vice-President, but doesn't seem to influence Rutskoi's political views today.

A *Pravda* military analyst Vasily Izgarshev has emerged recently in the Vice-President's close proximity. Some believe that his opinion is becoming increasingly important for Rutskoi.

Rutskoi or Zhirinovsky?

Hailing a stormy criticism against the President's advisers, ministers and his closest assistants, Rutskoi invariably emphasises his unconditional esteem for Yeltsin himself. What is this – posing, the loyalty of an officer, or genuine devotion?

Rutskoi can hardly have retained his former attitude towards the President. Is it possible though that he believes that all attempts to oust him from power are initiated by the President's retinue who has chosen the wrong people?

Will they try to force him to retire? Rutskoi is a fighter, and as Vice-President he can't be so easily dispensed with. According to the Constitution, Rutskoi is to physically take the presidency in the case of an untimely discontinuance of the President's term of office. In any event, he will remain afloat till the next presidential elections.

According to some experts, Rutskoi is elaborating a political platform of his own, different from the government's programme.

As President Roosevelt used to say, the most important thing for a politician is to see a strategic objective and to be able to choose assistants. As far as the objective is concerned, those well-informed affirm that Rutskoi has no integral system of convictions. His ideological creed sounds very uncertain, though attractive: "...a society in which one could feel like a personality."

As far as economics is concerned, Rutskoi considers himself an advocate of market relations, but primarily of a controlled transition to it, and emphasizes social protection. Incompetence in economic matters is mixed with sensible judgements in his articles.

Rutskoi cannot be regarded as a protégé of the army as a political force. In a sense, he is a Democrat – possibly, a purely intuitive one. He couldn't stand Polozkov as a Party leader, was banished from the Party for his democratic views, and defended the legitimate power against the putschists. There is no doubt about his unconditional acceptance of the basic principles of a democratic social system – division of powers, human rights, pluralism and a multiparty system.

Rutskoi has a trait which manifested itself already at the start of his career – a touch of national patriotism, so far, however, of a rather civilized brand. The theme of humiliated Russia is recurrent in his speeches, frightening Democrats and encouraging rightists. He has more than once been severely criticized for that by the press. Will the national-patriotic element gain strength in his convictions, or will it subside? In all evidence, Rutskoi's political face will depend on who precisely is going to exercise a permanent influence on him in the near future. The Vice-President will be fought for by the military-industrial complex, national-patriots, and the advocates of a unitary great power – former Communists. Today the best chances to influence Rutskoi are with those who best understand agriculture...

It would be sad if by the next elections our choice is between Rutskoi and Zhirinovsky...

Refuge for the wretched "migrant"

Mark Levin

In the heat of the battle for asserting the republic's sovereignty the smiles have disappeared from the streets of Tallinn. Now you rarely hear laughter there, but you do see many worried, gloomy faces. That's understandable: sovereignty gave each Estonian a sense of personal belonging to their own state and an opportunity to preserve their national customs, however it didn't give a feeling of protection against economic upheavals, spiraling prices or work layoffs. In this situation the people want to find who is to blame for it, to point to him as being the concrete reason for the misfortunes befalling them. If before, that is, during the fight for independence in the course of *perestroika* in the USSR, the Soviet Communists, the Party and state *nomenklatura* of the "victorious October empire," were considered the main enemy, then now, when national leaders have come to power in a democratic way, it is not easy to blame only the policy of the former "Big Brother in the East" for not creating the most favorable circumstances for the Estonians who have broken away from it. Nevertheless, the enemy image is not gone, but, just the opposite, has become even more concrete and nearer – the Russian-speaking "migrants," the "occupiers and their descendents," and all such non-native "buyers." Only one way is seen of conquering them – not exile (that would seem undemocratic in the West), but... squeezing them out. The Law on Citizenship of the Estonian Republic just passed by the parliament will be a powerful lever in this.

The loyalty test

Actually that law was passed more than half a century ago, in 1938. Now it has been made the law again, but with some cunning additions the repercussions of which can be heard far beyond the Vyshgorod Hill (Toompea) where the Estonian parliament is in session.

The matter is that the Law on Citizenship automatically grants it to all inhabitants of Estonia who were citizens of the Republic of Estonia before 1940, i.e., before the annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union (as some maintain) or before the restoration of the Soviet government here (as other see it), and their descendents. As for the rest of the people, their life on Estonian soil is now more complicated. Of course, in principle they can also become citizens – but only if they meet a number of obligatory conditions. For example, they must have been registered as permanent residents not later than the 30th of March, 1990. If a person meets this requirement and wishes to receive an Estonian passport, he must submit a corresponding application. It will be examined in the course of a year, during which it pays to study Estonian. After passing exams (incidentally, doctors need to know the language better than builders and scholars better than salesmen), it's necessary to take an oath of loyalty to the Estonian Republic and its constitution. Naturally, it will be necessary to acquaint oneself with the Estonian culture, traditions and the morality accepted in Estonian society. If a person goes through naturalization in this manner, he has a good chance of becoming a citizen. Anyone who has served time in the past or has not been loyal needn't apply.

In the republic a Law on Citizenship has been passed which would deprive practically all of the "non-native" population of the right to vote at the next elections

Is that all? Not entirely. The law was passed now because in a couple of months the elections of the President and deputies to the State Duma will be held. It's clear that the majority of the Russian-speaking population will not be able to participate either in the election campaigns or the elections since they won't be citizens yet. That's why some 600 thousand "non-

PUBLIC OPINION POLL

Does your country abide by human rights standards?

The poll was conducted by the service EUROBAROMETER of the Commission of the European Communities with help of the research firm ROMIR (Russian Public Opinion and Market Research). Director – Yelena Bashkirova



In this poll Russia turned out to place last. The residents of Estonia estimate a little higher the level of respect for their individual rights. In Lithuania and Poland the poll results split roughly fifty-fifty. The situation in the rest of the East European countries is more promising.

natives" (out of the republic's population of one and a half million) fear for their future. For their representatives can't get into bodies of power, and therefore can't express their interests. And this is already now influencing the economic and social rights of all living there. For example, the draft of the Law on Land is such that only a citizen of the Estonian Republic can become a private owner. And for a "non-native" to study the Estonian language is difficult even if there are few wishing to, for there are not enough teachers of Estonian, textbooks or buildings for classes. The few kopeks which are for the time being given for teaching "migrants" the state language (about a ruble a month per person) only evoke bitter jokes.

Half of the population is stateless

Now in Estonia a significant portion of the population is stateless – people without citizenship. And more than a third of it won't ever receive it. True, the Vice-Speaker of the Parliament, Marju Lauristin, thinks that the Russians in Estonia need not get anxious over this. First of all, they can always leave and go back to their historical homeland. Secondly, didn't the Estonians who left the country in boats for Sweden during World War II wait many years to receive citizenship? Yes. So it is no sin for the Russians now to pine in expectation of the decision of their fate...

And with such thinking, it goes unnoticed that the more or less civilized countries try to lessen the number of non-citizens living within their borders. While here they're increasing the number. Why? Could it really be only to sell bread, meat, milk and butter just to native Estonians, as some leaders in the Congress of Estonia uniting national radicals are already proposing? By the way the former Estonian premier, Edgar Savisaar, called them "national revanchists," and evidently not in vain... It seems the desire to get revenge, to get even with those living now for the Stalinist crimes is stronger than reason and the demands of the economy. And they, as is known, are quite severe. They cannot be satisfied by pointing to the "main enemy" in the form of a Russian or other non-native person...

In the meantime, production in Estonia has declined, the standard of living has plummeted, and the prices hit by hyperinflation are growing rapidly. And that's not surprising considering that the industrial enterprises – many of them until quite recently were subordinated to the Union centre and employed the most qualified workers – are closing one after another. With unemployment threatening and no political say, the top specialists are already preparing to leave Estonia... The farmers are already slaughtering the cattle in the villages, and this March it is still not clear how the spring sowing will go: so far there is no feed for the cattle nor fuel for the combines and tractors... Scholars, doctors, and people in the service area are flocking to the West. Curiously enough, the lion's share of them

The territories which remain disputable

"We don't interfere in the problem of

The first session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States took place in Copenhagen. The ministers of foreign affairs of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden, took part as well as a representative from the Commission of the European Community. *New Times* correspondent **Alexander POLYUKHOV** asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, **Lennart MERI,** to share his thoughts with him

Lennart Meri. The worsening situation in the former USSR makes it necessary for us to strengthen our ties with the West.

It should be remembered that to the east of the Baltic states is concentrated a huge arsenal of Soviet nuclear weapons which pose a big threat to European civilization. It is necessary to immediately establish international control over them in order to avoid a catastrophe.

The West doesn't realize the danger resulting from the destruction of the peasantry in Russia. We know there is mass hunger and cannibalism now, but who knows what else could happen there. In any case we are becoming more and more anxious and don't exclude a return to Stalinism as a form of totalitarian government in Russia. And there could be forceful interference in the affairs of the Baltic states again.

New Times. You singled out two concrete aspects: the establishment of international control over Soviet nuclear weapons and the destruction of the peasantry in Russia. What connection is there between them and Estonia's foreign policy?

L.M. It is up to us to defend Europe from the threat from the East. The Baltic states must become the European bastion on the border of Russia, and help preserve Europe's identity – the main achievement of the postwar period. It mustn't be forgotten that Western Europe is only a small peninsula where a great number of different and, in many ways unique, cultures arose and live together in complete harmony.

N.T. What role does little Estonia hope to play in solving such a huge problem?

L.M. Estonia sees itself as an equal partner of the Western countries. We not only receive aid, but offer our services. Among them are excellent information about the situation in the former USSR, knowledge of the Soviet mentality, and direct contact with

are Estonians. Experts in transport and power industry, builders, miners, metalworkers (Russophones make up the majority of these specialists) are seriously intending to go to the East. What will Estonia, which is striving to enter the world market, remain with? It is being torn apart inside not only by interethnic contradictions, but also by economic instability, the rapid changes in the corridors of power and corruption at nearly all levels.

In such a situation the local political radicals all the more spitefully reproach the non-natives for eating them out of house and home and all the louder demand help from the European countries and organizations. However, in the West they are not used to giving help forever, and the relationship with the neighbour to the East, which has the raw materials so badly needed by the Estonians and an unsatiated market, is not developing well. The government is afraid of being thought "Red."

"Estonia for the Estonians"

Several trade agreements have been concluded between Estonia and Russia, but they are insignificant. There remains the troublesome question of the so-called "disputed territories," in the Pskov and the Leningrad regions which Estonia has claims to. The Russian parliament stated that it doesn't consider these territories disputable since they have always been Russian lands which were in Estonia's possession only for 20 years... But they did belong to Estonia for a while! So far neither side is in a hurry to wrestle with this bone of contention, but you can bet that the Estonian politicians will sharpen their teeth on it during the coming election campaign...

The rights of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia will evidently be an issue the Russian government will have to tackle very soon. Otherwise it will have to deal with refugees from the shores of the Gulf of Finland. During his last visit to Tallinn, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev handed the Estonian government an impressive package of documents to look through, however, none of the Russian-speaking deputies were allowed to see them. The image of Estonia in the West, whose defenders of human rights are closely watching what is happening here, depends on how the Russian government handles the problem of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states.

In this connection it is notable that the West European politicians are talking about the growth of interethnic tensions in the Baltic states with increasing alarm. At least lately this problem has been worrying them more than that of the relationship between the Baltic states with the former Union centre. That's also understandable. There is the threat of the opposition today turning into a conflict like in Yugoslavia. Paradoxically many Russian-speaking inhabitants, feeling themselves to be one with the Estonian nation, not so very long ago voted for the sovereignty of Estonia. Their votes were used and then they themselves were forgotten. More exactly, at first they were forgotten, and then began to be discriminated against. Now it is almost impossible for a non-native to get a job, and in the institutes of higher learning the number of classes taught in Russian are being phased out entirely... The slogan about the priority of the native people which seemingly not long ago was frowned upon, is now coming into fashion again. Just as is the slogan "Estonia for the Estonians."

The non-native population is quickly becoming radical, more and more often can be heard good words about the times of the iron fist and the rule of the Communist Party when all people were equal, even if it be in poverty (by the way, that level of poverty seems like plenty in comparison with today). The flow of the non-native population out of the country is increasing. But Estonia is trying to enter the world market and needs a work force which it cannot pay according to the standards of today's civilized market. The sociologists predict that very soon it will have to resort to using a foreign but cheap work force. The places freed after the former "colonists" leave will be filled by the same people who do the work in the other countries of Europe – emigrants from Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa...

But today, unfortunately, the Estonian politicians aren't thinking so much about this as about the tactics of factional struggle for power in the parliament and government. The average citizen – no matter his nationality – feels that life is becoming harder each day. So the smiles have disappeared from the streets of Tallinn.

TALLINN

cannibalism in Russia..."

people who are participants in the most important processes.

Estonia can generate ideas which the West could carry out with the direct assistance of Estonians. You know, when baking a big loaf of bread, you needn't lots of yeast. You get my point?

N.T. I don't know much about baking, so could you give me more practical political ideas.

L.M. In the near future it is mainly Estonia that will become the front line of defence of Europe against crime, narcotics and other negative influences coming out of the territory of the former Soviet Union. We open our border to our Western Baltic neighbours, but we can no longer allow the penetration of killers and robbers from Russia to go on unhindered. Because of them the crime rate in the republic has risen ten times.

The eastern borders of Estonia must be closed up, the faster and tighter the better. We are doing everything possible about it.

N.T. Are you speaking about creating a new "cordon sanitaire" between Europe and Russia?

L.M. Yes, but now it will have just the opposite connotation.

N.T. The first, created in the period between two world wars, was to defend Europe from communism, and now it's to defend communism from Europe?

L.M. No. it's necessary to keep the consequences of the fall of the Soviet Union from spreading both to the Baltic states and to Europe.

N.T. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Andrei Kozyrev, in his speech before the session of the Council of Baltic Sea States touched on the problem of violating the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states...

L.M. He was probably speaking about Latvia. I don't know what he had in mind regarding Estonia. Maybe he was concerned about the Vietnamese that were kicked out of our country. But that's our business and shouldn't be interfered in. We don't interfere in the problem of cannibalism in Russia.

Even last year the President of Estonia, Arnold Rüütel, and the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, proposed creating a buffer zone to the east of the Estonian border (i.e., in Russia. – **A.P.**) to resettle certain nationalities. Such a preventive measure could have helped them avoid disappearing and promoted their renascence.

COPENHAGEN

N.T. POSTSCRIPTUM

As background which will help better understand Lennart Meri's point of view we give an excerpt from the Copenhagen Declaration of the Baltic Council, signed by him. "The Ministers have agreed that the recent dramatic changes in Europe herald a new era in European relations, where the former confrontation and separation are being replaced by partnership and cooperation. The development and expanding of Baltic cooperation is a natural and logical consequence of this." Maybe the extreme opinions of the Estonian Minister are due to the fact that he evidently took our correspondent to be a local one.

Far from the fighting front

Though no gunfire is heard in Baku, the war is uppermost in the minds of its population

Galina Kovalskaya

Baku welcomes with blazing sunshine, a lovely seafront and an attractively garbed smiling-faced younger generation. One might even think nobody there knows that a war is being fought. Even Moscow does not have so many commercial shops with inscriptions in English or Latinized Azerbaijanian. Incidentally, the long-nurtured desires of the advocates of national revival to renounce Cyrillic posed the serious problem of whether to have Arabic or Latin lettering. Arabic would spell a return to the traditional culture, Islam, Nizami and the Arab East, while Latinization meant ties with Turkey, Europeanization and a Western orientation. Latinization was preferred.

Baku abounds in truly Caucasian hospitality. Azerbaijanian friends worriedly wanted to know whether I had encountered any anti-Russian sentiments. I told them I had not run into anything of the sort, that on the contrary, every passer-by, if asked the way, would stop to explain in detail and often offer to accompany me to my destination.

The city is not oppressed by the tensions of war. Could this be an illusion? Or are the Azerbaijanians not at war at all? They are, sad to say, which one discovers as soon as introductions are over and current concerns are voiced.

Man in the street

"We don't know how to fight," it is said. "Do we have a proper army? Of course not. Take the Armenians. They're armed to the teeth. They've already kicked us out of Karabakh and are already in Agdam. Soon they'll storm Baku."

"Why is Russia mum, when it's with her guns that our people are killed? Folk are killed in Hodjali and in Agdam. Every day Azerbaijanians die – women, children and old folk. They're real bandits, those Armenians are."

How common. No warring nation, Armenian, Georgian, or Ossetian counts the victims on the other side. They only see the violence the enemy uses, and feel disgusted when the enemy victims are noted. The Azerbaijanians are no exception. True, now and again one hears a rational note.

"All Armenian captives and hostages must be immediately evacuated from Baku under the eye of international observers. Because after Hodjali, vengeance may be wreaked, and that will be horrible. It is high time to realize that if we are at war, we must abide by the rules of war. Let there be camps for POWs, whose upkeep would be better than what our underworld criminals get."

"We wanted to meet Armenian medics to discuss medical aid for prisoners, and commitments for their upkeep. We were making arrangements when the Hodjali massacre intervened. Today nobody in Azerbaijan will understand if we go there. For that matter, neither we nor Armenians can guarantee that agreements will be observed."

But the basic point made is: "Russia is continuing its old empire policy of siding with the Armenians. The 366th regiment is no exception. What Russia chiefly wants is to hold on in the Transcaucasia, especially in Azerbaijan, the region's sole really independent state."

This conviction is universal whether voiced by the man in the street or the statesman. Everyone is sure that Russia is exclusively for the Armenians, not because she



Hostilities are already near Agdam, which is outside of Nagorny Karabakh. Many Azerbaijanians are convinced that soon the Armenians will storm Baku

has any particular love for them, but because she has her own empire axe to grind. Counter-arguments are of no avail. There was a time when no Armenian could believe their fearful earthquake was not enemy handiwork. When it is said that Azerbaijanians are armed with the weapons the Soviet Army had before, it is retorted that these weapons were either seized or bought, or at any rate obtained not upon direct instructions from Moscow. On the other hand, it is contended that the Armenians are equipped with Soviet guns on direct instructions from Moscow. All are convinced that the Soviet army, which Azerbaijanians see as Russia's armed forces, is involved in the bombardment of Agdam. It is claimed that this is either tacit compensation for the Armenian release of the Soviet officers taken hostage, or a way of pressuring Azerbaijan not to withdraw from CIS.

Curiously enough, the Baku Russians I buttonholed fully subscribed to this conviction and accused Yeltsin of caring not for Russian soldiers dying for Armenia, but more for political objectives. I discovered that generally, local Russians entertain every sympathy for the Azerbaijanians. Could those who thought otherwise left?

Another slant: "Neither the Armenians, nor the Azerbaijanians in Karabakh want to fight. We cannot believe that the Karabakh Armenians are fighting. No, only the Armenian gunmen from Armenia are fighting. Locals will naturally defend themselves and stick up for their own villages, but never seek to evict Azerbaijanians from their villages. We know how hard it is to get Shusha residents to fight. How is Mamed to shoot at Stepanakert when his uncle or cousin lives there? Or neighbours who only last summer secretly visited one another!" Even should this view, which too is as common, be semi-mythical, it certainly furnishes a point of departure for a future peace as the anger felt against Karabakh Armenians is far less than against Armenia as such.

The political kitchen

Is there a solution for Nagorny Karabakh? I think no Azerbaijanian politician will agree that Karabakh is lost. Hardly will any Azerbaijanian generally think so. No wonder they associate a solution with a turn in the tide of war, with the seizure of the initiative and the prevention of Azerbaijanians evicting from Shusha – note that due to the Armenian offensive in Karabakh, the Azerbaijanians now hold only Shusha plus another three small villages. Next Azerbaijan's Popular Front thinks it vital to employ the national army to lock the border with Armenia. Its Vice-Chairman Kurban Mamedov assures me that nobody has any intentions of obstructing Armenian supplies of food, medicine, anything except guns. "Customs inspections are customary throughout the world," he says, "so as Armenia and Azerbaijan are two independent states, why not have customs?" Every Azerbaijanian believes that what should be done is to disarm the Karabakhans and bring home refugees of either nationality, provided they want to return.

What Azerbaijanians disagree upon is how the Karabakhans are to be disarmed. The Popular Front and the kindred Independent Democratic Party of Azerbaijan are convinced that the Azerbaijanians will be able to cope. However, they do not specify the technique.

Azerbaijan's only party openly calling for the internationalization of the conflict is the Social Democratic Party. Its ideologues maintain that to allay fears that Karabakh Armenians have for the Azerbaijanians, it would be mandatory to have foreign observers, including some from Armenia and also take certain other openly-professed steps, especially the prosecution of all ethnically based crimes. "Such observers," says Zardusht Alizade, one Social Democratic leader, "must stay for quite some time in Nagorny Karabakh to ensure human rights to both Armenians and Azerbaijanians." He advocated this plan in his televized pre-election sparring with Mutalibov and is convinced that a considerable proportion of Azerbaijanians would welcome it. "The people are tired of war," he says, "while efforts to 'resolve the problem by ourselves' would bog us down for decades to come and inevitably expand hostilities, in short transform the situation into a Middle Eastern-type hotbed. He contends that the question of whom the land belongs to would end the moment the land is privatized, as "then Aram and Mamed would know where their own land was and where the land of their neighbours would be, which would make the 'nationality' of the land sheer nonsense."

Incidentally, the Popular Front is not against foreign observers regarding this though not as a solution, but as a concession to the mood of the international community.

The "Islamic threat"

One day I watched a group of foreign reporters milling into the Popular Front building. Clicking cameras and looking around, they asked the first local functionary to step their way to tell them where the Namaz was observed, as they would like to take pictures. Though the functionary wanted to be of service, he couldn't for the life of him understand what they were getting at. "Is it Nadjafov that you want to see?" he wondered. Catching at the sleeve of another passing functionary, he explained his predicament. The second man asked the reporters: "Pardon me, but who is it you want to see? No Azerbaijanian has a name like that." The reporters explained that they meant the traditional prayer, the ritual. They were told that the Popular Front had regular breaks for the Namaz; however, when they said they would like to take pictures, there was some embarrassment as nobody could be found to observe the required ritual.

This facetious sidelight well mirrors the relationship between the myth of "Islamic fundamentalism" in Azerbaijan and reality. Baku is not a very religious city. Though with a population of two million, it has only two mosques, the same number as in Moscow, and there are no plans to build more. Only after European and especially Russian and Armenian mass media reported on the heels of Sumgait that this pogrom had demonstrated the traditional Moslem cruelty, did the Azerbaijanians realize that they were Moslems. Today they retort to every question about Islam: "What do you really know about Islam? And why do you think it bad?" Truth to tell, they themselves know a little more, if not a little less than we do about Islam. Of course, there are some really devout Moslems, but they are definitely in the minority.

Does this mean no danger lurks? I think, there does exist a danger, but of a different order. Today Azerbaijan has encountered a military debacle. It is not able, at least for the time being, to turn the tide of war by its own effort. Which means it will appeal to every source prepared to offer support. Considering the European community's unqualified sympathy for the Armenians, Azerbaijan will have to look to Islam. In such a case the absence of religious tradition and of true Islamic values may engender ominously aggressive fanaticism.

BAKU–MOSCOW

From Vilnius to Foros

The most difficult days for Gorbachev

The head of the Moscow office of the Japanese TV company NHK, Kadzuo Kobasi, interviews **Vitaly IGNATENKO**, former assistant to the President

— Did Mikhail Gorbachev sense at the end of the year of 1990 that the forces of the right were gaining in influence in society?

— It seems to me that it is not a matter of society. Actually it had matured and become more democratic... But forces grouped which were sympathetic to the right-wing opposition. Mikhail Sergeyevich saw the atmosphere of the plenums when they were held... Gorbachev was all alone among the Party leadership. He was worried about the growing criticism of those members of the Central Committee who took liberal democratic stands. Remember the papers of those times — at the end of December 1990? There was sharp criticism of Eduard Shevardnadze and Alexander Yakovlev, the biting article on Boris Yeltsin's speech to the people, and the taunts and jokes about Ivan Silayev. There was nothing about Gorbachev. But in essense all the articles were directed against him. They named Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yeltsin, Khasbulatov, Silayev, Burbulis, Popov, but they had Gorbachev in mind, for, they thought, the President did not actively oppose the stands of these political figures. I think that Gorbachev was in a very tough position then. He also swung to the right. It seemed to him that where power was there might also be the long awaited order. The right forces were symbolized by the leadership of the army, the KGB and the Party. Gorbachev hoped that with the help of these forces, even by using a risky political manoeuvre, he could stabilize the situation in the country. Every day we saw all sorts of letters and telegrams from factories and plants on his desk. They were brought by Valery Boldin. Kryuchkov also reported to him.

Vitaly Ignatenko, the former Editor-in-Chief of the *New Times* magazine and now the General Director of Russia's ITAR-TASS information and telegraph agency, was appointed the President's Press Secretary a year before the August 1991 putsch

...So the Party turned into the riot police?

Only now we know that the letters, telegrams and declarations had been specially selected. Gorbachev read the angry words of whole collectives about himself. They were usually Party members who wrote they thought he should quit the post of General Secretary and the like. I repeat, only now we know that this was done to keep Gorbachev under stress all the time. Primakov, Bakatin, Yakovlev, Chernyayev, all of us tried to counter this. We said that was not so, that it was necessary to take a broader view of things, and not to get all information from one source or listen only to the criticism of the democrats. And Gorbachev had the habit of spending half the day outside the Kremlin — he went to the Politburo and returned at 10 a.m., often depressed. More than once he admitted how hard it was for him to find a common language with the people on Staraya Ploshchad (Old Square, where the Party's headquarters were located. — **Ed.**). We understood that this was the very moment to talk to the President. And we said: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, you might consider leaving your post as General Secretary... You have enough to do as the President." He thought for a minute, but cut the conversation short... He answered: "Do you want the Party to turn into the riot police?"

He talked a lot about the demogogues who asserted that *perestroika* wouldn't work and that some "bourgeois forces" had gotten into the higher government echelons and succeeded in derailing the country from the right course... Such insinuations upset him very much.

— But the conspirators managed to work out their plan right under his nose. Did he really not know anything about it?

— Yes, this question bothers a lot of people still.

Gorbachev returned to the Kremlin from Staraya Ploshchad depressed: he admitted how hard it was for him to find a common language with his colleagues in the Politburo

I think it doesn't give Gorbachev any peace either. For example, Boldin worked many years with Mikhail Sergeievich. The President trusted him. He trusted Kryuchkov for a while. I think it's because Kryuchkov at one time had been recommended him by Andropov. I'll never forget the time Vadim Bakatin spoke in the Council of the Federation. He spoke sincerely and fervently. He insisted that military methods must not be used in the Baltic states and that he was right in giving independence to the Estonian police. Bakatin paid dearly for that. Some members of the Council shouted at him: "You wrecked the police force!" He stood pale and shaken. I thought that he would explode – answer sharply or walk out. Then Evgeny Primakov and Alexander Yakovlev took the floor to relieve the tension. Gorbachev followed them, but didn't criticize Bakatin. We left the session with heavy hearts.

In the evening, Bakatin's friends, Primakov and Sitaryan, visited him in the evening. They stayed with him all night trying to calm him down though all understood that the right had gained the upper hand and were pressuring Gorbachev.

– Could Gorbachev avoid that pressure?

– I think that they would have just removed him from power. They would have dismissed or replaced him, or something else... That's why he made a very dangerous political move and took position right of the centre in order to keep the grip on the country at the difficult historical turning point. He had always made it clear to Anatoly Chernyayev and Alexander Yakovlev that this was only a manoeuvre. He didn't use this word, but he made it clear.

Shevardnadze retires

After Shevadnadze retired and the Gulf War broke out, the military began to criticize the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze policy. They accused them of destroying the ideological foundation of the USSR and making a sacrifice of it to American politics.

– Is it true that is when the preparation for the August coup began?

– It appears to have begun much earlier, though those were bitter days. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, as well as other democratic leaders were mercilessly criticized. The campaign to discredit them continued even after the Allies' victory in the Gulf War. The goal was simple: to psychologically and morally prepare the people for the coup.

– They accused Gorbachev of giving in to the illusions of his former Minister of Foreign Affairs. By the way, how did Mikhail Sergeievich react to Shevardnadze retiring?

– I think he took it very hard. They had been very close... And Shevardnadze didn't mince his words. Here's what he said at that time: "He (Gorbachev) was and remains my friend, but he acted lightheadedly then, something that still surprises me to this day. If he had just heeded my warning about the coup it never would have happened. If the Union Treaty had been signed we could have begun the reforms and life would be absolutely different today: ours would be a great country which, having overcome a crisis, is trying to unite in the peaceful atmosphere of democracy. And Gorbachev commented on my retirement in the absolutely wrong way. He said that my fears were dictated by the emotions of an overtired man, that they were exaggerated, and that he himself didn't see even a shadow of potential conspirators. He even managed to convince my colleagues who at that moment probably didn't want to hear any other arguments. So our common cause was undermined."

– Did Gorbachev get any news of what was going to take place in Vilnius on the 13th of January?

– None, whatsoever. All thought that something big was about to happen, but in Latvia, not Lithuania.

– When did it become known?

– As far as Latvia is concerned, it was known before the New Year' that on the 27th or 28th something would happen in Riga. That's when the order was signed to joint patrol the cities.

– Why Latvia?

– In Latvia the Communist Party had enough authority. There were two quite



Yazov tried to convince Gorbachev that "everything was in order" in the Baltic states and "the patrols were out in the streets according to plan." Kryuchkov reported about some kind of "bandit forces" and "armed groups" acting in the Baltic Region. The President was misled...

strong organizations: the Popular Front and the International Movement. The situation in those days was alarming. Each day there were explosions in Latvia – 15 in one week! And before the New Year' the explosives were thrown either where there were Party committees or army detachments.

"Someone is professionally preparing a disaster"

– Mikhail Sergeyevich was very worried. When we gathered in the evenings in his office and discussed the business of the next day, he brought up Latvia again. He reasoned thus: "Judging by the look of things it isn't happenstance. Someone is professionally preparing a disaster." No hooligan could place the explosives so that no one got hurt. It's done to get attention! No, this is not something happenstance, but done professionally." He got right on the phone and demanded: "Give me all that is known about what is happening in Latvia." He sent people to Riga, and demanded the Supreme Soviet also look into the matter. He briefed commissions himself... He had this big panel in his office, and when he pressed the button he always used the first and middle name: "Boris Karlovich, what's the story in Riga today?" And Pugo began to say that everything was normal, that all was quiet, the Riga riot police were in place, that it was all the work of nationalists... Gorbachev got ahold of Yazov then and he reported that everything was in order, that the patrols were out in the streets according to plan.

This was at the time when the draft was being phased out, and in the Baltic states there was no draft at all. They had sent special troops there supposedly in order to sign up new recruits. At a press-conference I kept being asked and didn't know how to answer: is it necesary to sent paratroopers to enlist boys in the army? And I answered that these troops would remain in the barracks, that they wouldn't go out on the street. But actually, as we found out later, this was a blatant brandishing of arms, an act to instill fear. They pulled the wool over Gorbachev's eyes. The military told him that they couldn't get enough new recruits expecting him to answer: "See to it that everything is in order. Act within the laws of the Constitution." But from all that Gorbachev said they heard only one word: "Act."

Bakatin opposed using military methods in the Baltic states and the right forces succeeded in removing him

Gorbachev was completely sincere when he said that he didn't know anything about the events. Their preparation had gone on in other offices... On the Lithuanian and Latvian TV their boys were shown crowding around the recruitment offices and coming out happy to be in the Soviet Army... There was the usual information from the KGB: these are some kind of bandit forces, armed groups, we are fighting them. The information through the Party channels told that the Party was strenghtening its position and fighting provocations. Rubiks sent telegrams requesting support. Seemingly nothing unusual, in any case. No reason to think that these actions might lead to tanks and killing. All was done, according to various reports, in order to stabilize the situation, to prevent a national conflict, to protect people from rash actions. That was the information they gave the President.

Moreover, there was a very critical matter which occupied all the President's time. I

have in mind the report about the events in the Persian Gulf. A meeting between M.Gorbachev and G.Bush was fixed. And in the shadow of the big earthshaking world events, connected with the Iraqi agression, the whole situation in the Baltic states paled in comparison.

New Times or President

– Didn't Gorbachev see the articles in papers or magazines? Much was written about the Baltic states then...

– Gorbachev read a lot. He saw that the events in the Baltic states had stirred the democratic press. He saw the publications affirming that a serious conflict was in the making.

I am convinced that deep down he knew it all. But only today has it become clear that he simply protected us from some things so that we didn't get into some trouble because we knew too much. He was protecting us.

– How?

– For example he ignored when they tried to smear me. First one and then another suggested Mikhail Sergeyevich have me kicked out of the Kremlin. They kept track of who visited me and listened in on my phone conversations. They told Gorbachev all sorts of things about me, for instance, that I didn't conduct myself properly at briefings and permitted myself to speak on behalf of Gorbachev there. They whispered all that to Gorbachev, but he, to the contrary, supported me. Sometimes, however, after some critical article, for example, in *New Times,* I think, someone secretly reported to Gorbachev that it was me who organized the publication. Then he would say: "My comrades put the question to me: where do you work? Here with the President or in the *New Times* editorial board? In the future, they suggest, Ignatenko must determine where he stands." And though Mikhail Sergeyevich said this as if in passing, the answer was expected, and I answered: "I made that choice long ago. I work for you, but you can see my views in *New times."* Mikhail Sergeyevich diagonally pacing his office stopped by me and calmly said: "That's what I thought you'd say..."

The Kremlin, the 13th-14th of January

– What happened in the Kremlin on the 13th of January?

– That was a Saturday when Gorbachev usually doesn't come to work. They didn't even tell him about the call from Landsbergis. The office worker at the secretariat of

A secretarial worker failed to report to Gorbachev about Landsbergis' call. The President was not informed of everything taking place in Vilnius...



Alexander Yakovlev advised Gorbachev to fly urgently to Vilnius, bow to the dead, and acknowledge the independence of Lithuania

the President, having learned that Landsbergis called, was to act only if he knew what was going on in Vilnius. But he didn't. And since the Chairmen of the Supreme Soviets called Gorbachev every day, the office worker decided that the information about the call from Landsbergis could wait until Monday. But when Gorbachev appeared at work on Monday, we understood that he hadn't been informed of everything taking place in Vilnius. It turned out that some executives had called him at the *dacha* and said that there was trouble in Vilnius, the nationalists had organized some provocation. They said that at night there was shooting, our boys were hit and there were casualties on their side too... "Was anybody killed?" Gorbachev asked sternly. "We're finding out right now. It seems four were killed. It's being investigated," was the answer. Gorbachev demanded that people be sent there from the USSR Procurator's Office.

It should be said at that time in our country we had somehow become immune to someone else's pain. The blood had been flowing in Karabakh and we had gotten used to it. We weren't horrified by what had happened. But when we came to the President in the morning, we had quite different information (Bakatin had phoned us) – there were 15 dead. There were tanks. They had attacked the TV station.

– How did Gorbachev react?

– Gorbachev was shaken. He clearly didn't know everything. We all went back to our offices. We also were very concerned. My telephones wouldn't stop ringing. It seemed the whole world demanded an explanation from Gorbachev. But he was silent.

I went to Chernyayev. He took the events very hard. "You know," he said, "I've written a letter to the President. It's a very harsh letter. I told him that the Lithuanian tragedy cancelled the entire *perestroika*." Chernyayev's secretary who had worked with him for many years typed the letter but locked it in a safe so that Chernyayev wouldn't send it on that very day, and only later returned it to him. I said that I wouldn't work either. "Andrei Grachev came to see me. He refused to come work for us," sadly continued Chernyayev. However in the afternoon, the wise Yakovlev said that we must not abandon the President just now. Then we – Primakov, Bakatin...– gathered in Yakovlev's office. We thought up the optimal, in my opinion, way out of the situation: to convince the President to fly to Lithuania. To meet with Landsbergis, Burokevičius, the military and the KGB right at the airport. If necessary he could immediately speak before the Lithuanian parliament and acknowledge the independence of Lithuania and bow to the dead.

– What day was that?

– The fourteenth of January.

– Why wasn't that done?

– Yakovlev called Gorbachev. He enumerated all who had gathered in his office. "We have an important proposal to make to you." Mikhail Sergeyevich asked him to come see him. He listened to Yakovlev's proposal and said that it was a good plan and that we should go ahead to prepare the materials.

And by morning we had prepared texts, outlines, and collected material. In the evening I told my wife, as if about something final, that in the morning I was flying to Lithuania. I arrived at work at 9 o'clock. Nobody was there, nor at ten. At eleven the President summoned us and said: "Some comrades are against the idea, they say it is impossible to guarantee the security of the President." The second day passed after the tragedy. We understood that our plan was not going to be used. If only it had been! This, I think, could have been the beginning of the fall of the right forces. Gorbachev would have become Gorbachev. He would have done a very humane, very human, state act...

– Could Gorbachev have gone to Vilnius anyway and ignore the security agencies?

– The President has to listen to the opinion of his security people. If they tell him that they can't quarantee his safety, this is serious. He could have gone anyway, but as a rule that isn't done.

So we had to reconcile ourselves to the fact that our plan was a flop and then we said that Gorbachev ought to appear before the people and the press and make a statement. To finally dissociate himself. The President agreed and said that he would do so on Friday. But the press conference was too late... All sorts of suspicions had already been aroused: What really was Gorbachev's position? What was his role in these events? Certainly he had no part in them. But he must be decisive – immediately retire those who were responsible, bring charges against them, apologize to the Lithuanian people... But he again only went halfway. He thought that the Procurator's Office and Supreme Soviet would take over and straighten things out... And that would be the end of it. But it couldn't end so simply. He lost many supporters within the country.

All that I have told ought to help you understand what happened to President Gorbachev. Maybe now we better understand why he behaved the way he did – why he was so indecisive and why the compromises...

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The Sakhalin experience warns: politics is dangerous for business

Leonid Mlechin

The battle over a contract for the development of the Sakhalin shelf reminds one of a bulldog fight under a carpet: it is not very obvious for onlookers, but the dogs are tearing into each other and have made a wreck of the carpet

Twelve commissions discussed who should be allowed to develop oil and gas in the offshore waters of Sakhalin. Nine spoke in favour of a consortium consisting of two American (McDermott and Marathon) and one Japanese (Mitsui) companies. It seems the decision by the government commissions should have put an end to the controversy. However, the Sakhalin authorities continue to write protests.

Parliament is unable to cope with it

Sakhalin's complaint against the government commission's decision, signed by Vice-Premier Yegor Gaidar, appeared in the Russian parliament just when discontent with the cabinet, and most of all, with Gaidar himself had reached a high pitch, therefore it came at a very opportune moment. Some members of the parliament never miss an opportunity to give the young "father of the economic reform" a hard time and established their own commission.

The formation of similar commissions bears the imprint of our old system under which it was believed that a district party committee can consider and settle any question within a couple of hours because its members are guided by "class consciousness."

A parliamentary commission of this kind needs a competent staff capable of studying any special question within a short time. In the given case, the world experience of using foreign capital, and oil business practices should be examined. The Russian parliament does not have such a body of experts.

After a heated debate and long consideration the parliament did not dare refute the government commission's decision. However, no one raises the main question: can the parliament commission cope with such problems? The level of discussion in the parliament was much inferior to the level in the government commission, which thoroughly studied the merits of rival companies and each, even minor question connected with the development of the shelf.

Coal, silver, rice, but no oil

When the state had the monopoly on foreign trade Russia was robbed by companies of its "friends." Now that Russia is being drawn into world business large and small unscrupulous companies are striving to take the place of these "friends."

The Piltun-Astokhsky and Lunsky deposits are fit for exploitation. The first is mainly an oil deposit and the second is mainly a gas one. Why did specialists conclude that they should be developed simultaneously? The Piltun-Astokhsky oil will go for export and bring money necessary for the output of gas at the Lunsky deposit. Gas will remain for Russian needs

After the struggle for the right to develop the offshore deposits had started the Sakhalin leaders took a liking to the South Korean-American company Palmco whose interests they defended in the dispute with Moscow.

The story involving Palmco seems almost fantastic. My colleagues in the United States sent me easily available information about this company. Palmco, headquartered in the United States, has a staff of nine employees. It deals in coal, silver and high-quality rice. But there is no oil in its list. The company is headed by three Americans of Asian origin who appeared in the United States in 1970. The place of work of one of them seemed familiar to me. For 23 years Stanley S. Wang served in Civil Air Transport.

In the early 1970s the small air company was often mentioned in the American press. An investigation into CIA activity led to the discovery that the Civil

Air Transport was used by the US intelligence service.

It is certainly not a matter of the service record of one or another foreigner but of how business is conducted in the Russian way, when our officials do not want, or are not willing to, distinguish between respectable partners and petty adventurers, who obviously have more chances because they throw money around more readily.

However, the personal interest in the victory of one or another foreign company and the corruption of new authorities, openly discussed in Sakhalin and its regional Soviet, do not yet explain the matter fully. The main personal interest of the Sakhalin authorities does not lie in the understandable desire to go abroad at the expense of a foreign company taking part in the competition.

Sakhalin's governor Fyodorov regards the shelf deposits as a miraculous means for solving all problems. In this way he can rise in the eyes of the islanders and return to Moscow as a hero. The present government is not eternal. New people, who have proved their abilities as reformers in practice, will be required soon. With such hopes, the governor will leave the Khabarovsky and Primorsky territories without gas. He is determiend to let in only a company which will fulfil his demands.

A second Kuwait?

The Sakhalin authorities keep repeating that the island is fabulously rich, that it must be turned into a second Kuwait. It is a far-fetched comparison, however, because it is incredibly difficult to develop oil and gas in the offshore waters of the island.

Of course, Sakhalin's shelf is the most explored and potentially rich part of the Far Eastern seas. The oil and gas reserves of the Piltun-Astokhsky and Lunsky deposits are estimated at 100-odd million tons of oil and more than 400 billion cubic metres of gas, respectively. But how to extract them?

From October to June the ice cover is almost two metres thick. Ice hummocks, storms, cold and high seismic activity are registered in the area. Work can be conducted only for several months in summer. Oil output becomes very expensive therefore. It requires the building of complex and expensive ice-resistant stationary platforms and underwater communications protected from ice, says Alexander Retyunin, the chief specialist of Russia's Economics Ministry.

After the Piltun-Astokhsky, Lunsky, Arkutunsky, Izylmetievsky and Veninsky deposits had been discovered (without Japan's participation, but thanks to its credit), the Ryzhkov government naturally decided to produce oil and gas without participation of foreign companies. It was in 1988. However, it turned out right away that the country was unable to do that from the financial and technological point of view. This gave birth to the idea of holding a competition among foreign companies which have the necessary technology and experience of work in rigorous conditions.

Now that the choice has virtually been made the old idea is being revived. Why give such orders to foreign companies? The Severodvinsk submarine builders, for instance, can build the same platforms for oil-industry workers.

Platforms instead of submarines

The Minsiter of Industry, Alexander Titkin, who advocates the idea, landed in Sakhalin with a team of 50 specialists and began to explore how to provide jobs for workers employed in defence-related enterprises.

Conversion is necessary, of course, and the defence industry needs orders, for otherwise this empire is likely to explode. But can the position of the military-industrial complex be made easier by providing it with orders it is unable to fulfil?

Those who build submarines have no idea about ice-resistant platforms. The above-mentioned Severodvinsk plant needs considerable investment in order to master the new production process. Minister of Industry Titkin appealed to Russian entrepreneurs with the request to finance the national oil business. But who will risk investing money into it when banks give only short-term credits?

Foreign companies do not reject in principle the participation of the Russian defence complex. The Severodvinsk plant can get the order for the construction of a platform. But is there a guarantee that the platform will be delivered in time? A delay is impossible in the north. The platform must be fastened before the sea is frozen. Otherwise, it

SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY

Prof. Boris Grushin's Vox Populi poll

The government has more supporters than we think

Do you think that the economic reform is proceeding in the right direction and are the government's actions reasonable (variant A)?

Or everything is done in the wrong way and the reform is doomed (variant B)?
(leading public figures were polled over the telephone in January 1992)



The government has no fewer supporters than opponents among the political and managerial elite of Russia (as of a month ago): 40-odd percent of respondents back, though with certain reservations, not only the spirit but also the course of the current reforms. Among those who approve of the government's activity are first of all members of the Russian parliament (72 percent of respondents) and, what is extremly important, businessmen (57 percent).

A different opinion was expressed by servicemen and employees of the internal affairs and public security bodies (61 percent), as well as by leaders of political parties and public organizations of Russia (38 percent) and Moscow (42 percent), and by journalists (37 percent).

will simply be swept away. The failure to do that means a whole season could be lost and work can be resumed only in a year. This means that the organization concerned will not receive money, will be unable to settle up its accounts with the bank and, having incurred great losses, will go bankrupt.

A foreign company will not allow a delay. Any of our plants could derail the project. As before, nothing threatens them, because they belong to the state, and the debts will therefore be written off.

Life on the island has not yet improved

Why did the Sakhalin administration put its urgent affairs aside and begin to fight desperately for the right to have the final say in choosing a company for the development of the shelf among ice hummocks and icebergs?

Valentin Fyodorov quickly won the favour of the Russian press. A Moscow professor turned out to be not an armchair dreamer, but a skilful orator with a lively mind and quick reaction. He promised to redeem Sakhalin's freedom from Moscow, gain the right to use the mineral resources on a commercial basis, thereby securing a primary accumulation of capital.

Within a few years Fyodorov gained the reputation of a reformer of Sakhalin, a promising reformer for whom the island was already small. He managed to become co-chairman of the Russian National Assembly and simultaneously take part in the meetings of leaders of the democratic movement. Later on, also simultaneously, he gave up his post of co-chairman and lashed out at his colleague-democrats.

Life on the island has not yet changed for the better. Fyodorov promised that 500 farmers would feed the Sakhalin population. There are now 800 farmers on the island. However, food supply is as bad as in the whole of Russia. Deputies of the regional Soviet and people's deputies of Russia elected from Sakhalin are very critical of Fyodorov's activity on the whole and in the shelf question in particular. Valerian Timofeyev, chairman of the Korsakov town Soviet, describes the role of the governor in black colours, saying the island could have gas already if all those political games were not played. He even raises the question of impeachment.

But Fyodorov knows how to win public support. He suddenly recalled that an agreement on the joint development of the shelf concluded with Tokyo 15 years ago led to a debt which became "a heavy burden for the Russian budget."

Russia does not owe anything to Tokyo

The sellout of Sakhalin's mineral wealth and the dangers of foreign credits and investments are favourite subjects on the island. The huge debt to the "hated" Japanese who want to take away everything, even the native land, produces an impression on the people. In fact, the Japanese do not threaten the budget.

Several years ago Tokyo granted a credit of 181.5 million dollars at an annual six percent interest rate for geological prospecting in the area. As of January 1, 1987, the debt made up 276.6 million dollars. However, under the agreement the money or, more exactly, its equivalent in the form of crude oil should have been returned by Russian only if the deposits had been recognized as profitable. In oil business it is called risk investment.

Unfortunately, many of the officials involved in the Sakhalin drama do not understand the specific character of the oil business. Money needs to be invested for many years before it can yield a return. It happens that money gives no return.

According to the information available, by the time of the conclusion of a general agreement with Japan, the Soviet oil-industry officials knew that there are richer oil deposits than those which the Japanese were going to explore. However, they did not share this valuable information with their neighbours. The Japanese took risks and lost several hundred million dollars. But the financial losses were not used as an occasion for charges against Russia.

This does not naturally accord with the conviction of many of our compatriots that the greedy Japanese plunder poor Russia.

In the summer of 1987 the Chaivo deposit was recognized by Moscow as unfeasible. The Japanese agreed, but asked for permission to continue the exploration and never talked of the need to return the credit.

"Foreigners in the last place"

"It can be understood when the struggle against foreign capital is waged by so-called genuine Russians, for they are either arrant or hired madmen. However, not infrequently, the harm of foreign capital is discussed, even in newspapers, by people who pretend to have knowledge on the subject," Count Sergei Witte wrote with regret in the beginning of the century.

At the end of the century governor Valentin Fyodorov explained to an admiring journalist that he divides people into "three categories: islanders (Sakhaliners), Russians from the mainland, and foreigners," adding that the first should enjoy all privileges on the island and foreigners come in the last place.

It is difficult to believe that Fyodorov is strongly opposed to foreign investment and credits, as he tries to suggest to credulous journalists. His speeches at public rallies do not agree with the keen interest shown by the Sakhalin administration in foreign companies – not all, of course, but in those which understand what the governor wants.

An enumeration of what Fyodorov expects from companies wishing to settle on the island occupies several pages. He wants them to build a railway and a sea port, repair another sea port, put up several plants, an electric power plant, an airport, a maternity home, greenhouses and a customs house.

The govenor is not up in the clouds. A company which will be allowed to develop the shelf can naturally build the necessary infrastructure. But at whose expense? The governor promises to free it from taxes which should go to the Russian budget. In other words, Sakhalin will get what mainland Russia will lose...

Perhaps Fyodorov is right. The governor should think first of all about the prosperity of his territory. The oil- or gold-mining regions are poor because the state took away everything from them in the past. Today they intend to keep the profits for their own needs.

How to determine a sensible relationship between local patriotism and the interests of society as a whole?

Foreign companies should certainly help to develop the region concerned. For instance, Alaska prospers thanks to oil companies. But the US as a state is not the loser either, because companies are not blackmailed there. They are made to pay local and federal taxes.

* * *

Last winter 10 percent of the flats were not heated in Khabarovsk and in 30 percent of the flats temperature did not rise above $+10^0$ C. The Far Eastern region uses oil supplied from Western Siberia.

In the beginning of the next century the needs of the region in gas will increase five times over. If gas output is not started on the shelf, the Far East population will be freezing in winter and industry will come to a standstill.

It will be recalled in this connection that if the first proposal of the consortium McDermott – Marathon – Mitsui were accepted the Far Eastern region of Russia would receive gas already this year.

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JAPAN

The ruling party and the people

Sergei Butin and Vitaly Ganyushkin,
NT special correspondent

At parting, our hosts presented each of us with a heavy bronze medal with a caption which read: "The Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan." The medals carried a bas-relief of a pompous building which, however, was not the LDP headquarters where we met, but the country's Parliament. It was an unambiguous hint at the LDP being the master there!

The external mechanics of inheriting the state power is very simple in Japan: the party President automatically becomes Prime Minister – the master of the local White House. Which means that the party members, choosing their leader, elect the head of the government in his person. Nevertheless, this ascent, or promotion, to power occurs far from automatically – for these past 37 years already.



37 years in power – LDP: a unique phenomenon in the civilized world, beyond the limits of the former Communist enclave

Behind the scenes of the Japanese "Politburo"

Our interlocutors – Deputy Chairman of the LDP Commission for Relations with Parliament and a deputy to its lower chamber Moneo Suzuki and the Editor of the party paper *Jiyu Shimpo* Yasuyuki Suzuki supplied us with charts showing the structure of the party and of its ruling bodies from which it is evident that the LDP bodies and the structures of executive and representative power are closely interwined. Subordinate to the President of the party is the Plenum of LDP deputies to both chambers, whose resolutions rank equal to those adopted by the party Conference, as well as separate plenums of deputies in both chambers. Under the party General Secretary is the Commission for Relations with Parliament and the Coordination Bureau for municipal representative bodies of power. The Political Council, one of the party's highest bodies, comprises Departments for the affairs of the Cabinet of Ministers and of local executive power.

The ruling party does not shun responsibility, hiding behind the executive power and camouflaging itself with the façade of ostensibly democratically elected bodies. On the contrary, it openly aspires to and exercises its direct leadership in society. The government with all its subdivisions is sort of the party's appendage under the latter's control. Yasuyuki Suzuki told us that all the government does is decided upon by the party.

"So what?" one may ask. We had the same thing: "The CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers have decreed..." or "on behalf of the Party and the Government" – practically the same story – seemingly. The only difference is Parliament which we've never had and which we don't seem to have even now. Of course, we had the Union Supreme Soviet and its younger brothers in the Union republics. However, these were respectable assemblies made up of the Party-appointed messengers of the same Party, primarily functionaries, diluted for "democracy's sake" with the Party's heroes from among its rank-and-file. The most absurd resolutions of the CPSU were unanimously approved and adopted here on behalf of the entire people. These were not even decisions worked out by the CPSU, since they were made by its bodies of power, primarily by the Politburo and the Secretariat, or by the Central Committee at best, made up precisely of "the people's representatives" from the Supreme Soviets, but these were the elect ones of the elect.

Thus, whereas the President of the LDP is elected by this party's members (the President being the Prime Minister at the same time), Parliament is, in our own former parliance, the common cause of the entire people. Here everything is decided by the ballot box which needn't necessarily contain ballot papers carrying the names of the LDP candidates alone. And if there is enough votes to the contrary, the party may emerge from the elections not as a ruling, but as an opposition party. But even if it remains the ruling party, having the required majority in Parliament, it will have to take pains to promote the desirable resolution, for the opposition is not merely always there, it's always on the alert. Only recently Parliament rejected one after another three draft laws on political reforms in the country proposed by the LDP. Two years ago the party suffered a serious defeat at the elections to the Upper Chamber – House of Councillors, having

Of all kinds of "class struggle" sumo is the Japanese favourite

lost majority to the opposition. Here is the latest information published by our press under the headline "One more failure by Japan's ruling party": LDP lost interim elections to the Upper Chamber – in one of prefectures a candidate of the opposition was elected. LDP, no doubt, intends to square accounts with the opposition at the forthcoming general elections, but we shall see how things turn out.

True, the LDP's attitude to the other parties in the country is a devil-may-care one. Recommendations for the would-be LDP members state that "the LDP is the only genuinely popular party. In order to earn this high title, the party needs the support of broad popular masses and the LDP alone fully meets these requirements."

The price of votes

Yes, the situation is familiar – with the only difference that the support for the LDP by broad popular masses is purely voluntary, materialized in free expression of will through elections, which is totally inapplicable to our dear Party which, as we still remember well enough, was highly efficient in securing "the nationwide support" for itself by means of total control over the people's thoughts and aspirations.

Is, in this sense, the "popular orientation" of the LDP, as well as the process of confirmation of its supreme power in the country, without reproach? Certainly, not. I think, there are none and can't be any irreproachable parties anywhere in the world – all of them without exception use illicit methods with varying success in order to reach or retain power, although our interlocutors tried to convince us that the party's leadership can't exert any pressure on the electorate "by definition." "How is it possible to control which ballot paper is put into the ballot box by a voter?" they asked – no doubt, rhetorically, and were obviously insincere.

A control is, of course, possible. During the last decades, dozens of thousands of culprits have not only been caught red-handed, but even arrested by police at the time of elections, mostly to Parliament, in Japan – and all of them for all kinds of violation of electoral legislation, primarily for the attempts to buy votes.

Long live collectivism!

One of our close acquaintances told us, around a beautifully layed-out dinner table, about the nature of Japanese collectivism, which convinced us that this phenomenon is much more natural and, consequently, more lasting here than our former socialist collectivism. Without resorting to politics, referring exclusively to the experience of day-to-day life, he explained to us the hidden motives of collectivist involvement which has always been present in our life, too. It is believed that the Japanese have a hypertrophied sense of a "labour family": "our firm," "my firm," etc. And this is true, but the whole thing is explained without resorting to anything like a mythical "national spirit" or traditions – merely by the established and, as a rule, convenient for both the employer and the employee system of life-long contracts which encourages in the course of years the devotion to the firm by means of extending privileges (compare our recent practice of discriminating between a "bird of passage" and those having "an uninterrupted length of service"). The system is experimented upon in the West.

Kiichi Miyazawa, the next in a long line of LDP Premiers

However, there is also the reverse side to this veteranship – spiritual (as well as material) bondage as the price every employee must pay for the long period of service. Our interlocutor told us that he took no interest in sports, yet he couldn't afford missing a baseball match of his firm's favourite team, at least when broadcast on TV, because the next morning the entire "labour family" of the firm would spend hours on a discussion of the course and the results of the match, and if he failed to indicate in some way or other his intense involvement with "the family passion," he would fall under suspicion of being an "outsider." If such cases of falling out of the sphere of common interests accumulated, he would before long become an outcast with all ensuing consequences.

The question will arise: if the "firm's work collective" is capable of surveillance and control over such intimate functions of the human soul, what can be said about its (the soul's) political preferences, including the ways they manifest themselves during voting time – can one afford the luxury of voting, say, against the LDP while both the firm's leadership and the entire work collective are its "fans"!

The sophisticated mechanism by means of which ruling parties exert their influence over the masses look alike in the case of both the CPSU and the LDP. Even the *per capita* number of party members is quite comparable: about 6 million people to 123 million Japanese. At that, in addition to nearly 5.5 million full party members there are over 630 thousands of the so called "LDP friends" – just like our former cadidates to party membership. In Japan they are organized into "people's councils" all over the country which unite the "advocates of freedom and democracy." Having paid the annual contribution of 10,000 yen, such an advocate is issued the corresponding certificate of party identity and the party bulletin "The Path to the 21st Century" and on expiry of a three years' term he is entitled to participation in the elections of LDP President. Both the LDP members and its friends are, as a rule, efficient propagandists of the "party cause."

The burden we choose

We don't know whether anyone before us has considered the following phenomenon: after WWII the Japanese and ourselves ventured into peaceful life from similar positions as to the level of desolation (our eastern neighbours having had the A-bomb experience in addition). But here are the startling results: during these decades Japan has become Japan while we have even ceased to be the Soviet Union. However even when we still were a unitary power, we couldn't be listed among the universally recognized categorization of advanced countries.

At the same time the Japanese, be it for a bribe or otherwise, have borne the burden of the LDP rule for one third of a century already. As one of our now legendary leaders used to say, "he who is not blind sees" why and to where we have carried the burden of

The threat of economic hara-kiri is still far off

our dear CPSU. But why do the Japanese do the same, who compels them to? If you investigate into the matter a bit you'll see, that it is not a "who" but a "what," and namely the following document: "On the political credo of the party we create. First: the unconditional devotion to the principles of parliamentary democracy. In accordance with this, we categorically reject all ideas of destruction, violence, revolution and dictatorship, as well as the forces which consider these as means of their political activities. Second: our party regards individual freedom and personal dignity as the key condition for social life. We oppose autocracy and class stratification of society."

And now a riddle for the really sharp: Why have all of us, in the person of our possessed forefathers rejected the principles of parliamentary democracy, and individual freedom, and personal dignity as the key condition for social development, and all that with an unprecedented enthusiasm and amid streams of blood? We rejected these principles in the name of violence and destruction, revolution and dictatorship as well as in the name of the forces which consider these as the means of their political activity – in the name of autocracy and the class division of society. The Tsarist monarchy was not enough for us, under which, by the way, Lenin undertook publishing an anti-government paper and, while in prison, managed to write not only letters, but also theoretical opuses, riotous and, as it turned out, destructive for the same Russia he was going to save! Wasn't WWI enough for us?

Why did the Japanese who, like ourselves, were crushed and nearly completely destroyed by war, hungry and impoverished, when, in our logic, it was just the right time for them to expropriate all and divide it equally between themselves, – why did they vote for an imported (cultivated by Americans during the occupation), but still a human system of civilized and time-proven organization of society, especially of its productive forces?

Why, lastly, even now that we have the tempting example of prosperous and democratic Japan, why do we Russians hold onto the "advantages" of history's stinking dump where, hopefully, the lunatic ideas of bringing humankind to happiness by force as well as their authors – the latters' idols of stone and bronze – have been buried once and for all? A still conspicuous part of our social organism poisoned in the gas-chamber of communism, fights with desperate enthusiasm worthy of a better use for the right to live in that dump. The new President of the LDP who is also Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, says: "The government will strive to create a society in which everyone could live the life he chooses and be happy with it. The government will make Japan a nice place to live in." If one looks into any our pre-*perestroika* political reference book, he will find there that the Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan was for all eternity condemned by the CPSU as a party serving the interests of big bourgeoisie. Well, the LDP authorities are not hypocritical in this regard as used to be the case in our country – indeed, certain groups of Japanese business world actively support, both morally and financially, certain parties, or factions inside them, as they support the LDP. In a like manner the LDP tries in return to represent the interests of business circles. Who else, apart from large sections of business world, can support and increase social welfare in the conditions of market economy? And all citizens benefit from it in varying degree.

Equal starting chances

"This is precisely the issue!" will a Communist pop up. "To which degree? The revenue of Mitsubishi or Toyota, as compared to the income of an ordinary Japanese worker, is like the Mount Fuji compared to a nameless height!" Well, the LDP is unequivocal in this respect too – yes, they are incomparable. Anyway, the average pay of 400,000 yen, plus a sizable quarterly bonus, is worth something, especially when a TV set costs 50,000-70,000 yen.

The LDP, like the majority of other Japanese political parties, has never promised a mythical equality of incomes which is simply impossible among humans. Instead, it has created a society with equal starting possibilities for success and enrichment, as well as for getting impoverished. Japan scores dozens, if not hundreds, of simple "heroic" destinies – the present owners of industrial giants starting out nearly as social outcasts, with a few rusted nails making almost all their property. We have also personally come across such people, in all the glory of their present affluence and their unseemly past. And this is the pivotal aspect of our topic – the equality of chances: the daring one gains all. This backbone of human nature has never yielded and will never yield to any attempt aimed at its distortion, even in the name of universal "liberty, equality and fraternity." All this looks attractive at the barricades of class battles and turns into a myth, a euphoric pastorale when brought to the routine reality of human life. This was more or less the idea expressed by one of our interlocutors, Moneo Suzuki: "I don't know the reasons for the CPSU's collapse, but I would say by way of a general judgment that the reason lies in the correspondence or otherwise of the activity or of the actor to the essence of human nature. Talking about 'the benefit of all humankind' is nice as an idea, as a slogan, but what about the benefit of one individual human being, his family, what about everything which is directly determined by human nature? For us, this human nature is one of the key notions of 'Nipponism,' i.e. building of a Japan as visualized by the LDP."

Aren't Liberal Democrats unduly enthusiastic about their "national orientation"? Of course, it's one of their propagandist clichés, something like our dictum about the "Unity of the party and the people." However, its essence is different. Take, for instance, public opinion. It's common knowledge that before 1985, not only in the Party but in the entire country as a whole, the faintest attempts aimed at a more or less scientific research of public opinion were viewed as bourgeois delusions, if not anti-Party provocations – well, is there anyone who hasn't yet understood that the people are in unanimous support?

In the meantime, the Japanese equivalent of our "leading and guiding force" is, like a gigantic SDI, tuned to the stormy magnetic field of human passions. No money is spared on regular public opinion polls, all sorts of sociological services, research laboratories for concrete socio-economic studies operating both within the party and in society. Local party activists don't remain idle either, they organize political discussion clubs attached

to local LDP branches, political councils at the party prefectural associations and public disputes involving representatives of public associations. They have even a headquarters for mass civil movements. The arsenal of means is, generally speaking, rather familiar, but the content is different – not a brain-washing inculcating party ideas and resolutions, but, on the contrary, gathering ideas and studies of problems and aspirations of the homo Nipponicus.

The daily flow of this "intelligence" feeds the LDP rating. The pragmatic side of its thorough consideration serves the purpose of winning voters' trust, while its strategic objective is to elaborate the policy of "Nipponism" based primarily on the vector of popular moods. This is why the LDP Political Council which analyzes and generalizes all this exclusive information is the main party organ of power. It comprises 17 sectors for political studies and elaboration of the corresponding party and governmental programmes as well as of concrete projects. The Japanese are meticulous in everything – they have 46 research sections and 43 special commissions for current events. Besides, all LDP MPs without exception, including ministers, work in some party body or other.

Any political or economic project is first studied in the corresponding sector, then it is considered by Commission for Political Problems and, if affirmed by it, is forwarded to the Council for General Problems, the second after the Conference leading body of the LDP. And only on being adopted by it is the document directed to the Cabinet of Ministers and Parliament on behalf of the party... The LDP members are no less bureaucrats than we, but, unlike our state and Party apparat, its Japanese counterpart, with all its well-adjusted and infallibly operating mechanics, is not directed against the people, but to serve them.

A child of the "Japanese miracle"

Yes, a lot in common... It took us some effort during our talks to avoid writing in our notes the habitual "regional Party committee" or "Republican Central Committee" instead of "the prefectural association of local LDP branches."

Our interlocutors emphasized "with the feeling of lawful pride," as we used to put it some time ago, that during the time of LDP rule Japan's position and role in the contemporary world has radically changed: through greater responsibility and economic growth towards a higher role in the world community. The crash of the communist system and its empire is regarded by the LDP as a victory of liberal and democratic ideas on the worldwide scale, which has convincingly confirmed "the historical soundness" of the LDP.

Well, we are not going to argue – they know better. Nor have we any grounds to disprove their assertions about the steady growth of the Japanese people's welfare (since it's there for everyone to see) or the Japanese industrial miracle. Yes, it's the objective truth: in less than 40 years a society worthy of living in has been built under the aegis of the ruling party, using the Japanese people's deeply-rooted energy and creative potential. In a word – right on, comrades!

Scholars studying Japan say that the tendency and ability to compromise and the preference for concord are features of Japanese national character recorded in genes. If it is so, it means that this miraculous (unlike ours – "if the enemy does not capitulate, he is to be destroyed!") national substance must be accumulated by the LDP to be subsequently and successfully used in its socio-political practice. Our interlocutors spoke emphatically about the symbiosis of five factions in their party. Some further to the left, others further to the right, numerous and not-so-numerous alike – all of them fervently defend their positions within the common party line right up to party or parliamentary elections which are not necessarily won by the representative of the most numerous faction. The monopoly of truth is not bestowed on anyone here – it must be discovered as an outcome of, at times, very hot discussions. But if a controversy becomes a confrontation, alarm is sounded, and in this case a special political consultative committee of the LDP headquarters must have its word. The triumphant "truth," supported by the electorate, becomes a "material force" and the basis for at least a social consensus, if not peace.

A Marxist-Leninist will pop up here again: "And how about, for instance, the workers' spring offensive, imminent like the spring itself?!" And immediately a picture of "intense class battles" arises in his fevered die-hard Communist imagination. One small detail – these "offensives" have nothing to do with world revolution. They are a normal, civilized (legalized) form of "clearing up the relations" between labour and capital which allows adjusting of the far from perfect interaction of workers with their employers in the spirit of Japanese national traditions, i.e. without the Communist-favoured red colour of blood shed by the fighters for social justice – and all that so as not to impede the progress of the country. During its years in power the LDP has accumulated a universally applicable set of such regulating devices – from a flexible taxation policy aimed at a more or less equal distribution of state expenditures up to the system of pensioning.

To die for the Party cause

But why, oh why, and for what sins of ours has our "dear Party" always striven to shape us (and successfully) into unbending Fighters and Heroes of Labour? Its efforts have been so successful that we can't calm down up to this day, still fighting and struggling and striking against the walls and one another, without understanding what we are fighting for, and with whom. It's a kind of struggle with oneself as a form of socialist existence. Why are we what we are; why is everything with us upside-down, whereas all prosperous nations have long understood and proved by their own welfare that a class peace of any kind is preferable and more in line with human nature than the most gorgeous of all class battles. There are no, nor have there ever been, societies free from conflicts anywhere, and there can't be – and in this the classics of Marxism-Leninism are right. However, societies aspiring for the promised shores of concord and freedom from conflicts and those that have already attained them are at hand, right before us on the map of the world. When do we reach these shores! Or is it our fate to fight against each other till complete self-destruction? No, one can't understand Russia (and the CIS together with it) by power of reason...

This feeling of despair is particularly strong when one is on the territory of our neighbours with whom we can't settle the issue of disputed islands and where – can you imagine? – the salesman bows to the customer.

TOKYO – MOSCOW

Baghdad inflated not only vinyl chloride tanks

Only after the war for the liberation of Kuwait has the veil of secrecy over Saddam Hussein's plans begun to lift – plans to become a world sovereign with the aid of an H-bomb. This threat has not yet been removed

In the course of the war for the liberation of Kuwait one could not but give the aggressor his due for his aptitude when we watched TV reports on inflatable tanks and rockets filled with gas for impressive fireworks. Over the first days of the war these painted balloons were figuring in summaries of operations as hostile military machines which had been destroyed. True, the coalition forces soon got to the core of the Iraqi war ruse. But all the same it was difficult to tell a real tank from an inflatable one from the skies.

It proved to be just as difficult to recognize camouflage from the ground as well, when a commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arrived in Iraq. Prior to its arrival, the plant producing uranium oxide located in Al Jezira was urgently modified. Workshops with foam plastic and other similar materials scattered about looked as if they had been badly damaged by bombing. Key objects looked like ruins covered with road-metal. The bulk of the equipment was hidden in secluded corners and part of it was buried in the desert.

But what is done by night can be seen by day. The commission got hold of 53,000 pages of documents dealing with the preparation for the production of nuclear weapons. Some evidence also came from defectors who had worked on these secret programmes.

After the liberation of Kuwait the international coalition considered its mission fulfilled and finished. The head of the US Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf, was not given the three more days he needed to crush the last bulwark of the Iraqi dictator – his National Guard. Many now regret it. Until now it has not been ascertained exactly what the losses sustained by the Baghdad military machine amount to. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the coalition forces routed 41 Iraqi divisions, put out of action about 3,000 tanks, 1,800 armored vehicles, 2,140 artillery pieces and 35 combat aircraft. One hundred and fifteen planes were flown to Iran.

Nonetheless, the Institute estimates today's Iraqi power in rather impressive figures. The armed forces of Baghdad are already 380,000-strong, with 650,000 reservists, 2,300 tanks, about 4,500 armored vehicles, 1,000 artillery pieces, 250 combat aircraft and almost an entire fleet of military helicopters (only six helicopters were shot down during the war).

Iraq's uranium entrails

Over the last twenty years, Iraq has been violating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Its first nuclear reactor with a two megawatt capacity was built in Tuwaitha near Baghdad with the aid of the Soviet Union and was put into operation in 1968. Ten years later, its capacity was brought up to five megawatts thanks to the use of highly enriched uranium. In 1975 France agreed to help Iraq create a 70-megawatt nuclear reactor later to be called Tammuz I. In 1980 Brazil began to supply Iraq with uranium and uranic ore. In the same year 200 tons of uranic ore were delivered to Iraq from Niger and another 120 tons from Portugal.

Israel was the first to guess that Hussein's real purpose was not so much the development of power engineering as the creation of nuclear weapons. The Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, undertook a series of acts of sabotage, including explosions of nuclear equipment intended for Iraq and arranging murders of specialists. However, those actions did not stop Baghdad's nuclear programme, and on June 7, 1981, Israel bombed Tammuz I and destroyed it.

Since that time, the Iraqi nuclear programme went underground, and was made so secret that even driving by restricted areas meant capital punishment or an "accident" with lethal consequences.

Baghdad sprang many surprises on the IAEA commission. It turned out that over the past years Iraq passed from purchasing equipment necessary for the production of atomic bombs to the creation of factories producing such equipment. It was found that West European countries and even the US had played a decisive role in launching this dangerous production. Everything was bought in parts, and most often exporters did not suspect that this or that part could be used for enriching uranium or constructing a frame for an A-bomb. But there were Western companies which supplied Iraq with modern equipment and were well aware of its ultimate purpose. Some firms from West Germany, Switzerland and Yugoslavia distinguished themselves in this dubious field. China, Brazil and Pakistan also assisted Iraq in the matter. Legal proceedings were instituted against a number of companies.

It was revealed that about 10,000 highly qualified specialists had been taking part in the creation of atomic bombs in Iraq. Ac-

The factory for enriching uranium in Tarmiy another such plant somewhere underground?

cording to a member of the IAEA commission, this is more dangerous than equipment itself whatever it might be. Henri Jungo, head of the Acomel Swiss company, which provided aid for the implementation of the Iraqi nuclear programme through ignorance, said: "They (the Iraqis) were not stupid. They chose the best product on the market."

At present the Iraqi nuclear programme is well equipped and its production scale is really impressive. Eight underground factories which were discovered are producing all that is necessary for manufacturing A-bombs. The Al-Furat works alone makes 600 centrifuges a year. Incidentally, the stuffing for nuclear bombs is produced exactly in such centrifuges.

It is now known that Saddam Hussein launched an experimental programme to produce not only plutonium for conventional atomic bombs but also a lithium-6 element which is indispensable for the production of a hydrogen bomb.

It is becoming clear now why the world community is so worried about Iraq's unwillingness to reveal its secrets to the UN-sponsored IAEA commission. Baghdad authorities even turned a crowd against the commission members which began beating the UN representatives with the connivance of the local police. The commission still has a lot of work to do. It may well be that somewhere in Iraq serial production of atomic bombs is going on in full swing.

ot operate any longer... Could there be



Such trigger-detonating fuses for nuclear bombs were confiscated at the London airport on their way to Baghdad

What do we care?

The world community is worried about the fate of the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union, fearing that it might be used in local conflicts. It is known that the banned weapons, GRAD rocket launchers, were widely employed in the interethnic conflict in the Caucasus. Along such lines, one could expect even a nuclear attack, should they have an A-bomb.

Praise to Allah! For all his cunning, Hussein was not clever enough to agree with Soviet diplomats who sought to settle the conflict peacefully. Had they been given a respite, the Iraqis might have tried to "resolve" the regional problems with the help of atomic bombs.

Does Hussein have any chance? The present conservative opposition in Russia, which is out to restore the former Soviet Union, does not hide its sympathy for the Iraqi leader. Should it seize power, one could expect a new "USSR" to help its Iraqi friend create nuclear power for carrying out a joint struggle against "imperialism."

All supporters of Saddam Hussein become furious when they hear anyone talking about possible military actions against the Iraqi regime in connection with its refusal to implement the UN Security Council resolution on the elimination of the nuclear potential, chemical, bacteriological and some other types of weapons of Iraq.

It looks as if the Iraqi regime is in for trouble, and no one is trying to make a secret of it. The disruption of work by the UN commission on control and elimination of the banned weapons in Iraq does not seem to leave alternatives other than for the world community to intervene militarily. A number of European countries have already backed a military solution to the problem. The United States is also inclined to such actions. Before the presidential elections in November, George Bush would like to complete what was not finished during the Gulf War against Iraq and thus correct the mistake.

Besides a frontal attack against the Iraqi regime, preparations for staging a coup d'état in Baghdad are under way. They include mobilizing support for rebels inside Iraq – Kurds in the North and Shiites in the South, supplying them with arms and uniting the opposition forces so that Iraq's people themselves put an end to the regime.

There is also an economic factor which is not playing to Hussein's advantage. If earlier Iraq exported 22 billion dollars' worth of oil per year, at present the UN permits Iraq to export only 1.6 billion dollars' worth of oil within six months. It is becoming more and more difficult for Hussein to maintain his large army. Insurmountable obstacles have also emerged in the arms race. The Iraqi people's standard of living has fallen dramatically lately which is stirring up widespread discontent among Iraqis.

Studying all these circumstances, concerted military measures against this dangerous regime could turn out to be "the last and decisive battle" and bring a full defeat for the dictator, both on the international and local fronts. For too long the fate of the world in this region has depended on the caprice and whims of one individual. As long as he remains in control as a powerful leader in the Arab world, devising long-range plans for the future of the Middle East will be a more or less useless exercise.

Dmitry Zgersky

Photos from the Middle East magazine (Great Britain)

On the banana-peel diet

The Castro regime was subjected to public censure, which was declared a great moral victory in Cuba

Yevgeny Bai

The present, 48th session of the Geneva-based United Nations Commission on Human Rights was interesting primarily for the denunciation of Castro's authoritarian regime and for Russia's new stance. The latter declared firmly and unambiguously: no historical ties, economic relations or political interests can make it turn a blind eye to violations of human rights in former "fraternal countries."

Seguridad against poets

As a matter of fact, the decision of Russia's delegation to denounce numerous human rights violations in Cuba came out as early as a month ago, during the parliamentary hearings devoted to this topic. It was then that Sergei Kovalyov, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee and head of the Russia's Geneva-bound delegation, announced his rather figurative verdict on the Cuban regime. "We don't interfere in this country's internal affairs," he said, "but when poets are forced to chew their own verses there, we must say: 'No!' Verses must be published but not 'fed' to poets."

Sergei Kovalyov had in mind the public humiliation to which prominent Cuban poet Maria Helena Cruz Varela was subjected last autumn for her advocacy of the country's democratization and holding nationwide elections. An "indignant" crowd of fellow Cubans (in the opinion of those coming from Cuba, the leading role in such acts of "popular justice" is played by Seguridad plainclothes men) beat her and then made her chew pages with her verses.

The Geneva hearings showed that this kind manifestation of "revolutionary justice" is far from the only violation of human rights on the island. UN Secretary General's special representative for Cuba Rafael Rivas Posada, a Columbian by birth, cited in his report of 38 pages numerous instances of moral and psychological terror, police reprisals, cases of forcible psychiatry, beatings in prison, prohibition on the free expression of one's political views and on the creation of independent political and trade union organizations, practiced on "the first free territory of the Western Hemisphere."

Representatives of 23 countries (with 8 votes against and 21 abstentions) noted in the resolution denouncing the authoritarian regime in Cuba that the Havana authorities prevented Rivas Posada from visiting Cuba. However, this might be even preferable for Cuban human rights defenders – after an analogous UN delegation visited Cuba in 1988, over 60 dissidents were arrested there, nearly all of them having cooperated with the United Nations.

The end of pharisaic "love"

Havana's reaction to the results of the voting demonstrated one more time that Castro's regime is living through a severe crisis period. Just like Saddam Hussein had announced his warriors' victory after their degrading defeat, Castro regarded the results of the voting in Geneva as "a moral victory by Cuba and other countries which resisted American pressure." Havana officially accused its four former allies – Russia, Czecho-Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary of betrayal which, as was stated, "voted in favour of the anti-Cuban resolution, obviously striving to obtain the West's gratitude and counting on a reward."

In all evidence, Havana has but a very faint idea of the personal qualities possessed by Sergei Kovalyov, head of Russia's delegation, a well-known human rights activist and Andrei Sakharov's comrade-in-arms who spent seven years in prison (not so long ago – in 1974–81) followed by three more years of exile in the Extreme North and who has the habit of being accountable only to his own conscience...

As some representatives of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs believe, the stance Russia's parliament displayed in Geneva will not necessarily negatively affect economic and political relations between Moscow and Havana. In my opinion, however, the era of "fraternal friendship" and pharisaical "love" between the two totalitarian regimes is in the past. Castro will not forgive Russia for the public humiliation.

So what is Havana's victory then? The Cuban authorities have mechanically summed up the votes against the resolution and abstentions, thus obtaining a majority – from their viewpoint. Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia, Mexico and Peru who abstained from voting "showed the dignity of the Latin American continent in the face of Washington," as the text of the official Cuban announcement runs. This testifies that the world "did not obey the US dictate."

The position of Latin American countries deserves a special mention. Only Mexico traditionally rejects sharp criticism of the Castro regime, with which it continues to maintain rather close relations. As for other large Latin American oil-producing and exporting countries, they have not yet abandoned the hopes to persuade Castro to agree to some reforms. Such attempts were made twice last year by the leaders of Venezuela, Columbia and Mexico at their meetings in Guadalajara and on the Mexican Cozumel Island. In Latin America Cuba is still regarded as a member of a single Spanish-speaking family, although the



Cartoon from Newsweek (USA)

This photograph is a postcard's obverse side. The address on the reverse side reads: To Fidel Castro, President. The Palace of Revolution, Havana, Cuba.

The text of the postcard runs: Mr. President, this is an historical photograph. In 1955 young F.Castro (marked 1 on the picture) accompanied by Mario Chanes de Armas (marked 2) and other revolutionaries were released from jail on being pardoned by dictator Fulgencio Batista. Mario Chanes was also at your side during the uprisal of July 26, 1953, which initiated the Revolution. Mario had served his term, then was released, lived in emigration and returned together with you to start the guerilla struggle in the mountains.

After the victory Mario disagreed with the decision to follow the Marxist-Leninist course and was sentenced to 30 years in jail on your order. Although his term expired last July, he is not allowed to leave Cuba: by your order he has in fact been made a hostage.

Mario wants to join his family abroad. In the name of human compassion, let him leave. Respectfully (name and address).

least beloved one. Castro is granted a space for manoeuvre, he is allowed to retreat and hold free elections, in exchange for unequivocal promises of oil and political support.

To my mind, the recent actions by the Cuban regime kill all hopes of this kind.

"The country may explode at any moment"

During the last months the usual (and sometimes the only possible) way of escape from Cuba is... to register a tourist invitation to the CIS. Reynaldo Sanchez, a Havana engineer aged 50 who arrived in Moscow late last January by a fake invitation, says that he had made attempts to flee from Cuba to Florida for two years.

The plan of fleeing to Miami in a yacht failed, and Reynaldo was forced to hide away in his friends' apartments in Old Havana for many months. Later the idea of visiting the former USSR dawned on him. But even in this case, in order to obtain the ticket and the exit visa, he had to trick authorities of different levels.

Now he has found a shelter in a hostel for Siberian workers. But what is he going to do afterwards? "I can't return to Cuba," says Reynaldo. "As a last resort I'll buy a ticket to Havana, and when the plane lands in Gander (Canada) I'll remain there."

This same method of coming to Moscow, was used by another Cuban (he asked me not to disclose his name for the time being) of the same advanced age with whom I met last week. He served in Cuba as an Air Force pilot before his flight. "The country may explode at any moment," he told me. "Famine has already begun. People are looking for anything edible. A former anecdote became the deplorable reality – we make cutlets from banana peels.

"Most army officers don't appear in their units, because there is no food in the army dining-rooms," continues my interlocutor. "No foodstuffs, no detergents or soap. People try to take a wash using leaves of various plants, which leads to skin diseases. All this is accompanied with mounting anti-American hysteria and feverish demagogy. The entire country discusses in wisper the one and the same thing – when will this nightmare end, when will 'He' at last be gone..."

In a number of its publications *Granma* daily, directly or indirectly, lays the blame for the difficulties on the former Soviet Union which, as is pointed out, "has joined the criminal economic blockade by the United States." In the mind of the Cuban authorities, the unprecedented economic crisis has been brought about by cuts in oil and food supplies.

Manuel Garcia Diaz, one of the most prominent Cuban economists and a former deputy head of the Central Planning Junta, who asked for a political asylum in Spain last October, categorically disproves such conjectures. Yes, he says, the Soviet Union has done all possible and the impossible to keep the dictatorial regime afloat. But this is not essential. Castro could have become anything – a Communist, a Socialist, a Monarchist, a Roman Catholic or a Buddhist, but now he has become a leader of the fascist variety. The image of a "revolutionary romantic" who has chosen the wrong path is a myth. Castro is interested in power alone, and he will choose any path which guarantees him personal leadership.

Beginning with the late 1970s Manuel Garcia Diaz was member of a group which worked out a draft plan of economic reform adopted, along with certain political liberalization, by the first congress of the Communist Party in 1975. This plan was aimed at making the enterprises profitable and increasing labour productivity. M.Garcia Diaz demonstrates by figures that the years that followed (1978–85) were the most productive for the whole of the 30 years of social experiment. The economic growth averaged 5.3 percent annually.

But soon Castro felt that economic reform could undermine his personal power, and already in the early eighties he "reversed gear." Peasant market places were closed in Cuba, and a "new" model was based on the revived idea of the "contingent" – a militarized economic structure subdivided into brigades, squads, etc. As a result, the living standard of Cubans sharply sank.

Hot disputes still continue among those Cubans who have long lived in exile – is it possible to start a dialogue with Castro? Cubans who flee from the island now are unanimous in that no political reforms are possible as long as Castro is there. The dictator has obviously embarked on the path of "Cambodianization" – the resettling of large urban masses into the countryside, creating huge labour camps, and transferring to a subsistence economy with the abolition of money.

My interlocuter believes that the army won't fight against the people, but the specially trained police and riot troops of the Ministry of the Interior will mercilessly crush their fellow Cubans in defending the regime...

GENEVA – MOSCOW

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NEW TIMES INVESTIGATES

A spy who couldn't spy

Lev Yelin

The military tribunal, held in camera in Kiev, found Mikhail Valerianovich Fedotov guilty of high treason in the form of espionage and divulgence of military information which is considered a state secret or for other reasons has to be kept secret, and sentenced him to six-year imprisonment in a corrective labour camp with a maximum security regime, without confiscation of his property and without exile.

October 26, 1984.

...In the room occupied by ex-spy Fedotov in a communal flat on Kaznacheiskaya Street, St. Petersburg, nothing, except a centrefold from the *Playboy* magazine, indicates that he has ever served the Western world of mammon.

If one is to believe the eight-page text of the sentence pronounced to him, still being a callow youth of pre-conscription age, Fedotov dreamed of "collecting secret and top-secret military information and passing it on to representatives of a foreign state for a reward after having been discharged from the Soviet Army."

"After Mikhail had served two years in the army and a four-year term in a camp my contacts with him became painful and he was on the verge of a suicide," says his mother Mariya Nikolayevna, who has worked all her life as a nursery teacher. "I thought I should have enough patience with my own son after having nursed children of other people for many years, and I didn't break."

But her son could not adapt himself to life after he had been freed, and wanted to get into a camp again. A year later the doctors identified that he had tuberculosis.

Mikhail was late for our meeting. It seems he did not imagine well what the first interview in his life would be like. He spoke with irony about what kind of man he was at 19.

"I had no idea of state security and did not even hear about such words as 'political zone' and 'dissidents,'" he said.

British, Japanese and German "undercover agents" were unmasked not only by Stalin CheKa-men. This was done no less successfully in the 1980s

Drawing by Arkady Gursky

The prosecutors who revised the Fedotov case in 1988 described his behaviour as "infantilism." In other words, he who keeps company with wolves will learn to howl. If he does not learn to howl anything may become of him, and he is likely to continue his "education" in a prison camp...

How did it all happen?

Injections can be tolerated after all

"I served for about a year, and my nerves gave out, I did what 'seniors' ordered me and was on duty for three days running, but the officers did not care a hoot. 'Seniors' made me buy homebrew for them. After that they got drunk and hazed me at night."

Mikhail Fedotov and his friend left their unit without permission. They wanted to get to the Kiev Military Prosecutor's Office (the unit was located not far from Kiev) and ask higher authorities to transfer them to another unit. They were detained and placed in the psychiatric ward of the Kiev district military hospital.

"A doctor examined me and I explained all the figures and circles I was shown. 'Do you want to serve in the army?' he asked. 'I do not refuse to serve, but in another unit, without humiliations.' He listened to me with a glassy stare and promised to prescribe treatment for me.".

Fedotov spent three months in the psychiatric ward, cleaning its grounds. Doctors inquired about his health five times. He was injected with sulphazine and distilled water, and he does not know whether it was a way of treatment or punishment. Once, for overstepping the rules, Mikhail was tied to the bed in the isolation ward for 14 days.

"One day a doctor from our unit came to take me back, but I refused to go with him. I was again tied in the isolation ward and was untied only when I had to go to the canteen or lavatory – if I could do that, of course,

because after a sulphazine injection my legs became stiff and I felt pain in the entire body. I walked holding the wall. Sulphazine injections could be tolerated after all. I felt a terrible pain when distilled water was injected beneath the shoulder blade. Eight persons held me down in such cases."

A medical commission met at the end of the third month. Many were declared fit for military service in various degrees. The chief surgeon advised Fedotov to return to his unit. "I understood that otherwise I would be placed in the isolation ward again," Mikhail said.

The second year of service was more quiet for Fedotov. He was not even detailed for guard duty. In the spring of 1984, when almost the entire company had been demobilized, Mikhail was summoned by the platoon commander. "There is an order to deliver you to a special department," he said.

"The head of the special department and a major in the air force uniform from Moscow had already been waiting for me. They asked me about my friends and put forward other questions. I did not understand anything. Finally, they let me go. Later I understood that this was their way of getting acquainted."

"I hate the USSR"

When Fedotov was summoned for the second time officials of the special department got down to business. Did he divulge secret information? Did he share it with his mother and friends?

The unit in which Mikhail served sometimes took part in the delivery of nuclear warheads for medium-range missiles. Officially, it was called "the transportation of aircraft engines."

"The soldiers knew everything about the operation and told me about it when I came to serve in the unit. They also wrote home about it, saying they carried out a very important mission, and they were proud of their part. True, I went on such a mission only once," Mikhail said.

Fedotov honestly admitted in the special department that he probably revealed some information, for otherwise there would have been nothing to write home about.

> "In his three letters to his mother dated June 30, July 19 and December 13, 1983,and three letters to his acquaintance, N.A.Muravyov, dated May 2, June 22 and July 20, 1983, Fedotov divulged military information about the commanders of the military unit 12474, the presence of a railway base in it, the location of the training subunit, the character of his activity and separate measures taken by the command of the detachment of which the military unit 26156 is a part."
>
> **From the sentence.**



After two years in the army and four years in a prison camp Mikhail Fedotov could not return to a normal life for a long time

Photo by author

"They produced my letter to Muravyov, whom I know from the first grade in school, saying I wrote in it, 'I hate the USSR.' I wrote this indeed, because I was angry on returning from the psychiatric ward. They inquired about the figures. I explained that they did not mean anything. It was simply a game taken from one of Conan Doyle's stories," Fedotov went on.

Later, when Fedotov was interrogated in Kiev, the investigator shouted.

"It is a cipher! You would decipher it on returning home and would sell the secrets to foreign intelligence. You bastard, you coded the information in a way that KGB decipherers can't understand anything."

> "Acting deliberately to the detriment of the sovereignty, state security and defensive capacity of the USSR, Fedotov gathered a considerable amount of top secret and secret military and state information between the spring of 1983 and May 6, 1984, by means of questioning his fellow-servicemen, personal observations, overhearing and remembering secret information divulged in his presence by other servicemen, and analyzing the information obtained in this way."
>
> **From the sentence.**

Officials of the special department took the minutes of the interrogation. "If you make a clean breast of everything nothing will happen to you," they said. "Tell us who else received letters from you." "What a fool I was... I wanted to return home and told them everything. Perhaps I'm guilty indeed and wrote more than was allowed. Let them see for themselves..."

At the fourth or fifth interrogation Fedotov saw a new Lieutenant-Colonel who was introduced as "a Moscow comrade." Officials of the special department asked Fedotov to repeat everything to him. He was not told of course that it was Eduard Prokopov, a senior investigator into especially important affairs and a great specialist in the unmasking of "foreign spies."

"I again explained that I wanted to boast and had no evil thoughts and that the cipher was a joke, and this is clear right from the start."

In the meantime, "witnesses" appeared in the case. The main of them is Nikolai Muravyov, who hardly deserves even an attempt to draw a psychological portrait of him. Brought up on the fertile soil of informing against everyone, Muravyov received a letter from Fedotov before he was drafted into the army. Later, already serving in the unit, he asked mother to send Fedotov's letter to him and took it to the special department.

The other witnesses are fellow-servicemen. It turned out that conversations in the smoking-room can be interpreted as divulgence of secrets or an attempt to gather secret information.

> "In 1983 and 1984, in violation of the secrecy regime, Fedotov divulged to outsiders part of the highly classified military information which represents a state secret.
>
> "For instance, in conversations with Private Gakhovich, a military builder, and Private Rodionov in June 1983, and January and May 1984, Fedotov divulged information about the character of special military cargoes carried by the military unit



iew of the 35th Perm Zone. Fedotov was brought here twice

12474 and the location of their storage.

"In August 1983, he told Sergeant Paramonov about the task of this union.

"On May 1 and 2 Fedotov divulged to Private Osipov information about the location and purpose of two army units.

"In making all this information known to others Fedotov did not pursue treacherous aims."

From the sentence.

It was dangerous even to stand beside those ho "divulged" secret information. Here is hat the sentence says: "It follows from the vidence of witnesses Tyukin, Kukharenko nd Grigoryev that, coming to the smoking- oom, Fedotov did not always put questions to iem and other servicemen who had returned om a mission, but simply listened to their onversations on how they accompanied spe- al cargoes and who dispatched or received iem and at what address."

Fedotov remarked that his words were dis- orted in the record. "I told them that I did not ilk with Muravyov about selling information o foreign intelligence. But they wrote quite ie reverse. They examined me with such ressure that I could not say anything. I al- eady began to uderstand what they wanted ut like a fool continued to believe the inves- gator. He kept repeating that the matter will ot be taken to court."

Mikhail Fedotov, 19, could indeed be re- roached for infantilism. Several days after ie interrogation, when his full uniform was rought to the guardroom, Mikhail became fad, thinking that he would go home.

However, under an armed escort, he was taken to a KGB solitary cell in Kiev, where he was kept for six months. Two months later the investigator said with sympathy:

"It will be impossible to avoid a trial. Experts of the General Staff confirmed what you wrote about your commanders was an absolute secret."

Studying "espionage" cases I arrived at the conclusion that experts of the General Staff always regarded soldiers' letters home as a state secret.

While the KGB questioned Fedotov's friends in Leningrad, he went through the prison ordeal.

"Once I was brought into the cell and saw there a man about two metres tall. Well, I thought, I'll be finished off. But the man turned out to be the manager of an ironmongers shop in Kiev. Then I stayed in the cell with a man who had fine convictions. His entire body was tattooed. The man taught me how to behave in imprisonment."

Fedotov was again sent to the psychiatric ward for an examination.

"The moment I start explaining to the doctor that I am not guilty he says in reply, 'Yes, of course', and prescribes what pills I have to take for a quiet sleep."

Mikhail was put in a cell together with criminals – thieves, murderers and rapists. "I thought they were brutes. However, relations between them were better than in the army. One of them was a former priest, a 'traveller,' who robbed churches. He felt sorry for me and said that the KGB was framing me."

Before a trial the investigator, Eduard Prokopov, promised that the "mildest" article will be applied to Fedotov, because he assisted the investigation. A day before the trial Prokopov brought with him a lawyer, A.Panikhidnikov, Hero of the Soviet Union.

"They worked together on such cases. Panikhidnikov talked with me for half an hour in the presence of the investigator. 'Do you plead guilty to this charge?' he asked. 'And do you plead guilty to another charge?' I understood everything at once. At the trial Panikhidnikov said that I was young and silly. 'The psychological and emotional development of Fedotov,' he said, 'has not reached the level where he realizes the gravity of his offence'..."

> "At the trial the defendant Fedotov pleaded guilty of the charges brought against him and gave details of the offences committed by him. He explained that he committed high treason in the form of espionage for mercenary motives, with the aim of earning money."
>
> **From the sentence.**

"I thought then what would happen if I refused to plead guilty to anything from the outset and denied everything at the trial. But I doubt it would have helped. Vadim Simonov, also a Leningrader, denied everything till the very end and went on a hungry strike. He was subdued nevertheless, pleaded guilty to espionage, and was sentenced to ten-year imprisonment."

The trial was held in the building of the military tribunal of the Kiev Military District at the end of October 1984. Fedotov was guarded by KGB ensigns, and there were seven civilians in the courtroom. Witnesses from among soldiers were inconsistent in



- 7 -

п. одела, предусмотренного статьей ст. 56, ч. I УК УССР.
По этим же основаниям суд считает возможным не применять к Федотову дополнительную меру наказания в виде конфискации имущества, предусмотренную ст. 56, ч. I УК УССР.
На основании изложенного и руководствуясь ст.ст. 323, 324 и 327 УПК УССР, военный трибунал

П Р И Г О В О Р И Л :

ФЕДОТОВА Михаила Валерьевича признать виновным в измене Родине в форме шпионажа, т.е. в преступлении, предусмотренном ч. I ст. 56 УК УССР, в разглашении сведений военного характера, составляющих государственную тайну, при отсутствии признаков измены Родине, т.е. в преступлении, предусмотренном п. "а" ст. 253 УК УССР, в разглашении военных сведений, не подлежащих оглашению, но не являющихся государственной тайной, т.е. в преступлении, предусмотренном п. "б" ст. 253 УК УССР.

ФЕДОТОВА Михаила Валерьевича лишить свободы сроком:
- на основании ч. I ст. 56 УК УССР с применением ст. 45 УК УССР на ВОСЕМЬ лет без конфискации имущества и без ссылки;
- на основании [illegible] 253 УК УССР - на ДВА года ;
[illegible] УССР - на [illegible]

"Guilty of high treason in the form of espionage"

their stories about the criminal deeds of Fedotov. When the judge reminded them of what they testified at the preliminary inquest, they quickly "recalled" their evidence.

Mikhail fainted when the prosecutor demanded that he should be sentenced to 9.5-year imprisonment under three articles of the Criminal Code. "The ensigns gave me some tincture of valerian and whispered that it was not yet a sentence and that I shall be convicted under one article. Then a pretty secretary was seated in front of me in order to divert my attention in some way.

> "At the same time, the military tribunal takes the following facts into account: before being called up for military service Fedotov was engaged in socially useful labour, did nothing reprehensible; he has franky repented of what he had done, actively assisted in the exposure of the crimes perpetrated by him, and did not pass the information gathered by him to anyone."
>
> **From the sentence.**

As the investigator promised, the military tribunal passed a mild sentence for an espionage case: six years in a maximum-security prison. Fedotov was to be taken to Perm.

"I said goodbye to Lieutenant-Colonel Petrunya, chief of the isolation section. He treated me well and helped me take more food with me. But he replied that inmates do not say goodbye here."

However, in 1989, Fedotov was brought back to the Kiev isolation section of the KGB.

A letter to Vienna

Fedotov was transported from Kiev to Perm through Kharkov, Sverdlovsk and Kazan. He came to learn the world. "At first, I was the only convict, but in Sverdlovsk I was put in the cell together with tightly guarded convicts. Food began to disappear from my knapsack quickly. The 'chief' prisoner then beckoned me to come up and tell everything. I told him what had happened and the others gave the food back to me. At night they offered me two gays. I was horrified by the suggestion."

A month later, when Mikhail arrived in the 35th Perm Zone, the country grieved over the death of the Party's General Secretary Chernenko.

"*Perestroika* began as soon as I arrived," Mikhail says. "However, I didn't expect anything good. The inmates of the 35th Zone are famous people now. They explained to me that we should not expect an amnesty."

One of them was Yuri Surguchev, a "French spy." He served in the Arctic region and learned that the USSR had placed nuclear weapons there in violation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Surguchev wanted to make it known to the world public and tried to get in touch with French representatives. But a KGB man came to meet him.

In 1987, Fedotov and Surguchev wrote a letter to the Vienna conference of European states. It was intercepted, and Fedotov was kept for half a year in a cell of the 36th Zone.

In 1988, the authorities began to release inmates convicted under Article 70 (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda). In summer, Fedotov was driven to Perm and then carried by air to Kiev, where he was placed in the same cell. He dreamed of freedom but was also afraid that several more years would be added to his term. The KGB officials in Kiev explained that his case would be revised "in view of the newly discovered circumstances."

"I was no longer a callow youth," Mikhail said. "In the zone I was fully informed about everything. That is why I told them: 'If you again ask me about the passing of secrets to foreigners I will refuse to talk in general.' They replied that such a promise could not be made. I refused to talk and they put me in the cell. On the next day I refused to go to the interrogation. However, Petrunya talked me out of doing that."

The investigators promised that punishment could probably be mitigated and began to ask Fedotov about the style of work of Prokopov, his previous investigator. "Examining other cases, they evidently learned about his methods," Mikhail remarked.

Fedotov's acquaintances in Leningrad were questioned again. However, witnesses from among soldiers were not summoned up. Shortly afterwards Mikhail was taken to the Serbsky Central Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow.

"I spent less than a month there and understood soon that the conclusion would be advantageous to the KGB. They wrote that I am absolutely healthy and that during the first investigation I was 'inclined to psychopathy and, potentially, to fantasy and overestimation of my actions.' I objected, but the doctor laughed, saying, 'Don't, all are cranks today'." Mikhail was placed in the Lefortovo prison, and the chief of the special department of the Kiev Military District arrived there before long. He told Fedotov that he would be transported to a prison zone again.

Fedotov, as he said, will "remember for a long time" his travel in a railway car packed with drugies and criminals. He spent nearly six months in the zone, and then a paper was received from Moscow. It said that Fedotov's case should be discontinued for lack of corpus delicti and that Fedotov should be released.

The Supreme Court of the USSR, meeting on December 23, 1988, adopted the following decision:

> "Officials of the KGB's special department (military unit 61289) themselves created a situation in which Fedotov learned the information known earlier and divulged it to officials of the same department."

The information which Fedotov made public was not state secret, though "it was not to be divulged". This formulation must be specified in my opinion.

KGB men in the army constantly had to justify their existence. The "Fedotov case" was one more entry in their report, which meant bonuses and promotion in rank. A weak man alien to the tough army environment and potentially yielding to pressure was chosen as a victim.

On the basis of the material available to me I venture to affirm that a large number of the witnesses from among servicemen had been recruited by the KGB. Incidentally, this indicated the degree of the KGB's penetration into the army. During the investigation and at the trial these witnesses carried out the task set by the KGB.

If my conclusions do not seem convincing I shall tell readers in the next issue about one more "espionage" case, this time with a "national" colour.

ST.PETERSBURG – MOSCOW

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

"When I am asked to explain whose class interests Fichte's philosophy serves, the question makes me feel foolish..." This remarkable phrase was uttered by Pyotr Berngardovich Struve, the author of the article which follows.

The name of Pyotr Struve is already familiar to our regular readers (see, for instance, *New Times* No. 29, 1991). He was, undoubtedly, the most prominent Russian thinker of the 20th century – brilliant, incisive and versatile. To our reading public his heritage still remains *terra incognita* waiting for its thorough explorers. This "crusader for Russian freedom" is as yet an unfathomed and contradictory figure who all too frequently befuddles his interpreters. To begin with, our publishers ought to bring out his complete works and the best of what has been written about him abroad – say, by Semyon Frank, Richard Pipes and N. Poltoratsky. Our own literature on Struve – except, perhaps, a few short but profound articles by Yuri Pivovarov – is scanty.

And this despite the fact that Pyotr Struve is perhaps the only philosopher to provide an insight into the political situation in Russia at the turn of the 20th century and into the drama of the entire 20th-century Russian history, what's more, into the post-Peter the Great period generally. Some say that the ideas of the Slavophil Ivan Aksakov furnish the key to Pyotr Struve; conversely, the works by Struve himself furnish the key to the last-century Slavophilism and to the heritage of Ivan Aksakov himself. (Incidentally, this Slavophilism has little in common with its widespread interpretations, much less with the "crude patriotism" which is now mistakenly, or just ignorantly, referred to as Slavophilism).

As to Struve, he and other thinkers of like mind were in the very middle of the political spectrum, caught between the irreconcilable extremes of conservatism and revolutionism. Struve had to assume the role of an "eternal opponent," like Thomas Mann did later and under different circumstances. Alexander Solzhenitsyn sarcastically labelled Struve a "perfectionist," but perfectionism is actually a merit rather than a flaw. Indeed, Struve made high demands of himself, his political allies and his opponents alike. He combined patriotism with a high intellectual and spiritual potential and loyalty to the cause of freedom.

Brought up to give standard answers to questions like "Whose class did Fichte's philosophy serve?" most of us will find Struve difficult to understand. Let us try, though: the attempt may be rewarded with a better understanding of ourselves.

The mysticism of state power

Pyotr Struve (1870-1944)

From the point of view of the state, ordinary conservatism and ordinary radicalism are equally shortsighted. They make the mistake of seeking to explain all political and social changes by reason, or, on the contrary, lack of reason, using as criteria of rationality the principles of morality and expediency applied to the behaviour of an individual. It has long been established that neither society nor the state is a simple sum total of individuals. This truth, however, has not been studied and thought over in all its objective significance for understanding the state, for politics. Historians have long noted the fact that the reason, interests and aims of individuals can be hopelessly at variance with the growth of the state and its might.

In his struggle for self-preservation, an individual lives for himself, which means that he can look only a limited period ahead. The state lasts much longer than an individual, and from the viewpoint of an individual and his reason it is suprarational.

This can be expressed in words as follows: the state is a mystic creature. The statement of this fact, however, is not mystic, but highly positive. It is not our intention here to argue over whether the state is good or bad. The state is mystic, and this is a fact. The reason why the idea of eternal peace is utopian is that it contradicts the mystic nature of the state. War is the most graphic and the most convincing manifestation of the mystic nature of the state. When wars disappear, the state will draw closer to "people" and get down to earth. Will this ever happen?

The mystic nature of the state shows in that an individual now submissively, now joyfully and even enthusiastically sacrifices himself to the might of this abstract being. Nietzsche spoke about the coldness of the state. On the contrary, one can only marvel at this distant being's ability to emit a multitude of hot attractive rays, to warm up and fill human life with them. This is exactly what the mystic nature of the state consists in: though remote from the individual, it compels him to live in it and for it. In saying that, I do not mean the technical facilities of the state as an orderly community which caters to the needs of an individual, but the supraindividual and suprarational essence of the state which the individual serves and for the sake of which he dies. Mysticism consists precisely in this absolute reality of the suprarational.

Isn't the mysticism of the state made clear by the words of Peter the Great as he called upon the Senate to think of Russia and to show no concern for him personally? Speaking of Russia, Peter, who had destroyed so many human lives, thought neither about the "people," his subjects, nor about himself. His mental gaze was riveted to the state. Anthropomorphically speaking, the state wishes to be powerful. This feature of the state is another manifestation of its suprarational nature, because the might of the state by no means makes its citizens strong or happy. There does exist a certain correlation between the strength of individuals and

the might of the state, but this correlation rests on religious, rather than on rational principles.

The specific features of the given state show in its relationships with other states. Therefore the might of the state is an external characteristic. Today the public and publicists consider the state's external might to be dependent on its system of government and on the situation on the domestic front. But the mysticism of the state consists in that the state's power over the "people" manifests itself in their subordination to a remote, alien and – for an overwhelming majority of people – abstract idea of the state's external might. By subordination I mean not external and physical, but internal and moral subordination, the recognition of state might as a social value.

It is a common view that "rational" or "free" recognition of the state is "inner" and "moral" as opposed to "irrational," "external" and "physical." But then any recognition of the state as such, as a mystical formation, is irrational, and so is free, heart-felt and therefore moral subordination to, and identification with, the state.

Any state presupposes the domination of some over others. It has long been noted that power and government establish human relations which are irrational and suprarational, that power is a kind of hypnotic spell. This observation is perfectly correct, because power is not merely a means of regulating the human community, or rationalizing public life. Such a definition of power applies above all to power as an instrument of state might.

Power and government establish human relations which are irrational and suprarational, hence power is a kind of hypnotic spell

This is why the mysticism of power manifests itself so graphically in a war, in which the mystical nature of the state is disclosed in that people lay down their lives so as to uphold its might by the authorities' orders.

We have already mentioned the fact that power is an instrument of the state's external might and as such is keeping the people in submission. If it ceases to perform this vital mission, which is most closely connected with the mystic essence of the state, power wavers and falls.

Publicists refer to this as dependence of foreign policy on domestic policy. Actually, the correlation is exactly opposite to the vulgar idea of it, which would have been true hadn't the state been mystical on top of its rational elements.

What is called imperialism today is a more or less clear indication of the fact that the state wishes and – since the state is valuable to the individual – should be mighty.

Any living state has always been, and will always be permeated with imperialism in this sense.

If imperialism implies concern for the state's exterior might, and liberalism, concern for more justice at home, then the countries which combined and embodied both concepts in their poilcy to the fullest extent led the world in every respect in the 19th and the early 20th centuries. Within individual states, imperialism, imbued with the idea of state might, triumphed over traditional rational liberalism. Defenceless in the face of "reason" and morality based on it, imperialism triumphs because there is behind it the mystical nature of the state which has power over people. Such is the historical significance of Bismarck and the philosophical meaning of his deeds.

The national factor is closely connected with the state factor and shares its suprarational or mystical character. No human rationality or expediency can explain why Ivan Sidorov had to die at Pleven, and Ota Nitobe, at Port Arthur for the sake of the state, any more than one can explain by rational motives why a Frenchman should always remain a Frenchman, a German a German, and a Pole a Pole. This is taken for granted and never discussed. This is one of the axioms Potebnya has written about, something "which is not subject to discussion."

Language and the works written in it are the most lively, flexible, refined and majestic manifestations of national character mysteriously connected with its puzzling essence...

This is why after language has emerged on the body of statehood as a limb and an expression of a nationality and its culture, the demise of statehood does not mean an end to this nationality. The latter seeks to create statehood, sometimes of a new and more powerful kind (Italy), and whether it succeeds in that or not it lives on anyway and endures the most unfavourable conditions (Poles). Given certain favourable external circumstances and psychological combinations, ideas may create statehood even apart from the national factor or despite it. To illustrate, the idea of freedom, transferred by the Puritans to the woods of North America, created a new statehood there, which now has a long record of respect for personal freedom and public self-government.

On the other hand, the correlation between the state and a nation may be of an entirely different nature historically. The Italian and German nationalities are much older than the Italian and German states. A nation is a cultural entity above all, and the state as a cultural force is a vital factor in forming a nation.

Any nation is always based on a common past, present and future, on a common cultural heritage, common cultural effort and common cultural aspirations. That was clear back in the classical antiquity, when Hellenism was a broad national idea which spilled over state limits. Isocrates linked up the very idea of Hellenistic culture with successes achieved in "thinking and eloquence"...

The value and strength of a nation lies in the value and strength of its culture measured in terms of what can be named as its cultural creativity. Any major nation seeks to create its state body. However, the idea and life of a nation are always broader, richer and freer than the idea and life of the state. Goethe is more unquestionable than Bismarck, to paraphrase Turgenev, who said that Venus of Milo is more unquestionable than the principles of 1789. A nation which is only a specific and unique expression of culture lacks the tough element of coercion inalienable from the state, because culture, in its idea and in its supreme real embodiments, always means the spiritual forces of mankind in their free growth and unification. The national factor is as mystical as the state factor but with another hue, softer and more intimate, owing to which it masters man without any compulsion.

One may hate his state, but not his nation. By hating it, man alienates himself from it. Having rebelled against the parent state, North American settlers ceased to be

ritish in the sense of "British subjects" but not to be nglish in the sense of Anglo-Saxons. The French are ccustomed to using the word "nation" in a political nse, which is due to the national integrity of the rench state's population... The past and the present rnish evidence to the fact that the nation as a cultural ıtity does not fit into the limits of what is termed "the ate." The state is something more abstract, less organic ıd therefore less stable and weaker than the nation and ationality. There is the state of Württemberg, but there no such thing as the Württemberg nation...

The state element is at its most mystical when it in-rtwines and merges with the national element. Fused gether into one, these two elements may cause massive ıtbursts of patriotism.

As I have already indicated, the talk about the mystic ature of the state is not ysticism. On the contrary, is positivism. Some may ject that in the course of story the mystic or, which the same thing, religious aracter of statehood is eakened or renounced al-gether. This is true, but ot quite. Cultural progress rtainly rationalizes human e in general, public life in particular. But there are nits to this rationalization, which is hardly likely to vallow up the mysticism of the state and of the nation-ity.

> A nation which is only a specific and unique expression of culture lacks the tough element of coercion inalienable from the state

The state and nationality are connected with the in-adicable r e l i g i o u s needs of man. Religion with-aws man from the limited sphere of his personal exis-nce and gives him access to a broad superindividual ing. But cannot individualism create its own personal ligion, and cannot this religion overcome the mysticism statehood and nationality?

This question may seem idle now that individualism ıs become so widespread and, at the same time, left a ligious imprint on the positive negation of statehood d nationality (religious anarchism). A positive answer this question obviously suggests itself.

Nevertheless, things are not as simple as all that.

Individualism, which, as its name implies, centers on e individual, his needs, his interests, his ideals, his ıer world is the most difficult, the least accessible, the ost aristocratic and the most exclusive of all religions. is difficult for a religious person to worship a mere ıman individual or even humankind. Individualism as ligion teaches to recognize the infinite dignity or value the human individual. But in order to proclaim this ividual the criterion of everything, or the supreme lue, it should be assigned the greatest mission. It has absorb as much valuable content, as much beauty and sdom as possible. And not only to absorb, at that. The ividual is not a storehouse. As a religious idea, the ividual is an embodiment of valuable content marked uniqueness and energy, or intensity. It is only the ıd of individualism which sets itself such a great aim ıt can be religious. But what does such religious indi-lualism mean, and what does it accomplish? While ıding man away from the religion of the state and na-nality, such individualism by no means brings him arer to the empirical conditions of human existence, to the usefulness and benefit of an individual or of a whole society; instead, it takes him to a sphere which is more remote and higher still.

This means that such individualism overcomes the mysticism of statehood and nationality not by its mere negation. After all, a combination in one artistic, religious, always personal and unique but always objective and necessary content of the great capacity for reproducing the world within onself with an absolute freedom of attitude towards everything in this world – "to yourself, to your preconceived ideas and notions, even towards your people and your history," as Turgenev put it in one of his incomparable letters, is the supreme form of attitude towards the world. Religious individualism is an artistic view of the world in which the great subjectivism of unique feelings combines with the absolute objectivism of the universal laws of perception, mysticism with realism, and personal with common.

This is why religious individualism cannot be prescribed, let alone publicized. Propaganda, proselytism and, what is the same, popularization will kill it... For all his freedom, a religious individualist is restrained and has the sense of measure. For all his mysticism, he never holds forth on the secrets of his soul but, on the contrary, is shy of disclosing these secrets, which mean so much to him. But then he gradually takes in the world, and if he is capable of creation, he generously lavishes the spiritual wealth he has accumulated on all. He does not parade his religion; if he is an artist, he may communicate it to kindred spirits through images, colours and sounds; if he is a thinker, he may substantiate it philosophically; if he is a practical worker, he will put all his conviction and all his tolerance into his work. But he will never advertise his religion!

To conclude, individualism as religion is the most private concept of life and the world which is extremely difficult, for most people, to arrive at. Requiring an objective attitude to all aspects of life, it rises above statehood and nationality and at the same time is capable of appreciating them and therefore does not deny them outright.

No one can realize better than a religious individualist does that his own and other lives can be sacrificed for the honour and greatness of the state; no one can feel more keenly the irresistible force of the national idea and understand that although it would be more "rational" for the Poles in Poznan to become Germans, they must fight for their nationality out of their love for it.

He is not afraid of recognizing a "prejudice," because he knows that reason, for all its strength, is not without its weaknesses.

Russkaya Mysl,
1908, No. 5

Two years ago *New Times* published an interview with Prof. **Vadim Rakhovsky.** The distinguished physicist spoke about the emigration of Soviet specialists to the West. As head of the Centre for Collective Use of Analytical Equipment, he did his best to check the brain-drain. The scientist arranged for the delivery of modern Western equipment, succeeded in having the wages of specialists increased, and established ties with colleagues in other countries. In January of this year the Centre broke away from a major research institute and gained long-awaited independence.

The building occupied by the Centre was restored by the efforts of its future staff. Having given up their work for some time, the physicists rolled up their sleeves and completely repaired the falling apart old house. It cost them 400,000 rubles.

A new problem arose before the staff after the prices had been freed from control. The district authorities of Moscow charged four million rubles a year for the lease of the building.

The Centre led by Vadim Rakhovsky is known in America and Western Europe. Many of the physicists who worked under his direction are now employed under contracts abroad. Despite financing by two private firms, the Centre does not have enough money for the lease. "No one can guarantee that in the present situation the Centre will not be closed and scientists will not rush abroad in search of a better life," the professor says.

* * *

Boddy-Joe Broviak, 15, cried hysterically and nearly fainted when the doctor told her that she gave birth to four babies.

She met the father of her children in a cinema one and a half years ago, when he was a high school pupil in Tampa, Florida. Bobby-Joe asserts it was love at first sight. Having learned that Bobby-Joe was expecting a baby, Mark – such was the boy's name – did not think of evading the responsibility. After some resistance on the part of the parents, the couple began to prepare for marriage. However, they met with an obstacle. Under the laws of Florida, in which the couple lived, a 15-year-old girl cannot marry, even with the blessing of her parents. Moreover, it turned out that Mark could be brought to trial for liaison with a girl who had not reached the age of consent. The couple had to move to Georgia, where the laws are more liberal.

Bobby-Joe felt increasingly worse, and she was placed in a hospital. It was established there that she was going to have four babies. The doctors did not guarantee that all four would be saved and insisted on an operation to save at least the two, most sturdy babies. But the expectant mother did not agree. Now that everything is over Bobby-Joe says she is not going to have more children. Those she has are quite enough for her. It's good that they appeared at one go, not four separate births, she adds.

* * *

Yuri Longo, a member of the International Association of Sorcerers and Magicians, asked the Kremlin commandant for permission to conduct an experiment on the body of Lenin, because "it will apparently be buried soon." The aim of the experiment is to "restore the motor functions" of the body, "reanimate" it to some extent. Longo says he has already experimented on corpses in an ordinary morgue. "I excited certain power centres, pumped energy through fingers into a corpse, charged the entire organism with biopoles. The dead man stretched his hands for me, opened his eyes,

Dumas is good for your health

A Russian society of friends of Alexandre Dumas was formed in Moscow a month ago, and **Mikhail Buyanov** (see *People*, No. 44/91) was elected its president. Buyanov is a noted psychiatrist, writer and regular contributor of our magazine.

The author of *The Three Musketeers* lived for 68 years. Of them, he spent 8 months and 18 days in Russia. Dumas wrote a dozen thick volumes about our country. However, till now most of them are not known to our readers.

Buyanov sees his main task not only in popularizing the works of the great novelist but also in promoting "chivalry and brotherhood between people and nations." He believes that "in our nervous time full of fear, panic, rumour and superstition, the popularizing of Dumas as a personality can play a wholesome, encouraging and psychohygenic role."

The society intends to unite not so much experts on the creative work of Dumas (in Buyanov's opinion there are few of them; almost everyone considers himself a great "authority" and despises the "rivals") as advocates of his philosophy which rules out intolerance, spite and chauvinism.

Travels to places associated with Dumas in Russia, the Caucasus and France have been promised for members of the society. Besides, there are plans of establishing several medical psycho-therapeutic centres for children and juveniles.

The society is open to citizens of any country who have reached the age of 15. However, Buyanov warns that "the incorrigible egoists, squabblers and people obsessed with the idea of being in the limelight at any cost" should not join the society. What about those who share his ideas? Buyanbov says: "We are not an assembly of angels, but a community of ordinary people who believe that our imperfect world can be improved, on the way to brotherhood and democracy."

stood up and made several steps."

Though Longo promised the high church hierarchs not to disturb the dead any longer, he is ready to make an exception for Lenin so that he would "stand up and look at the result of his deeds."

Yuri Longo has enough experience in "communicating" with politicians. Several times he hypnotized members of the Soviet parliament and, as he alleges, "almost all of them fell into a state of hypnosis."

Longo considers himself a master of white magic, though black magic is not alien to him either. He can put a magic spell on a person. He can also give a man in despair the following advice: "Find the tree to which you are attracted, come up to it, put the palms of your hands on its trunk, look up and ask God, Fate, Cosmos and Nature to bring you good health, prosperity and spiritual forces." It may be that they will respond to your plea.

* * *

At meetings with journalists **Keanu Reeves** appears in a threadbare "Hawaiian" shirt, wrinkled trousers, and a patched-up jacket. It seems he did not shave for three days. His hair is entangled and ragged, and there are dark spots under his eyes.

In Hollywood this young actor has gained the reputation of an eccentric and not very pleasant bloke who does not like to talk much about himself. Keanu Reeves does not visit local fashionable places and does not like to buy his clothes in shops preferred by other Hollywood stars. However, he drives his car at a mad speed, likes blues, and reads Stanislavsky. Nevertheless, his name appears more and more often

in the films of famous directors. The last of them is Francis Coppola, who invited Keanu Reeves to play in his new film "Bram Stockers Drakula."

Catherine Bigelow, who invited Reeves to play in her film "Point Break," says that his performance is devoid of artificial or far-fetched mannerism. It is something innate. The purity and open-heartedness, combined with strong individual characteristics, produce a splendid effect she adds with admiration. Reeves plays a FBI agent who has infiltrated into a Los Angeles gang which robs local banks. Gangsters approach the bank-tellers in masks depicting Reagan, Nixon, Carter and Johnson.

Keanu talks little about himself and his work. "Some things amuse me, others do not, and I don't know how to determine it," he says. His name "Keanu" means a "fresh wind blowing from mountains." He was born in Lebanon, lived in Australia and then in Canada. At present, he lives in a canyon near Los Angeles.

In the opinion of a *U.S. Magazine*, which specializes in determining the rating of actors among the young, Reeves possesses such charm and natural attractiveness that they simply go crazy.

Keanu plays the main



part in "The Splendid Adventures of Bill and Ted." The hero, with his unintelligible speech, eccentric pranks, hair covering his eyes and rather strange walk, has captivated most American teenagers. The film was released last autumn. One of his numerous teen-age girl admirers says: "He's totally sexy. He's 28 but looks ten years younger."

* * *

Not a good match



Unexpected news spread throughout Spain. The 24-year-old Crown prince, **Felipe Borbon,** is prepared to give up the right to be king if he is not allowed to marry Isabela Sartorius, a very pretty girl, but not a princess.

Their engagement was announced in the middle of February. The news threw the royal family and court into confusion. For the first time in the last 200 years the Crown prince is going to marry a girl who does not belong to high society.

Isabela, who is three years older than Felipe, graduated from Georgetown University with a diploma in international politics. Her biography was "spoiled" by her mother, who divorced her husband and married a Peruvian, a man connected with the Communist Party. Besides, Isabela's mother was involved in a narcotics scandal. To cap it all off, her uncle Nicolas Sartorius is a Communist, the former leader of the anti-Franco struggle and now a member of the Cortes. He had served a ten-year imprisonment for his participation in the underground movement.

As a result, Queen Sophia strongly objected to the forthcoming marriage. King Juan Carlos adopted a neutral stand while a greater part of the public supported the prince and his sweetheart.

At the end of February a book entitled *Isabela, Almost a Queen* appeared on sale. The author writes favourably about the prince and especially Isabela, who is described in the media as "a Cinderella of the year 2000."

In addition to her main profession – prostitution – *Aileen Wuornos,* a 35-year-old drifter from Florida, had a hobby. She killed middle-aged men by stopping their cars on interstate highways and persuading them to go to a secluded spot with the promise of sex. Though the principal motive was man-hating, Wuornos did not forget to rob motorists after killing them.

At a recent trial Wuornos admitted that she had been luring men to their death for three years and had murdered seven victims in this way. Her lawyers argued that Wuornos had struck back in self-defence after her clients became abusive. But both her brother and lesbian lover disputed this argument.

Under the laws of Florida Aileen Wuornos was sentenced to death. However, the execution of the sentence was deferred because new details came to light. Wuornos will appear before the court again. This time she will stand trial on six other murder charges.

* * *

Fortune-tellers should switch from tea leaves to the periodic table

Pyotr Berezhnev, Victor Tolmachev

...In pedestrian underpasses, modern-style soothsayers offer to calculate your vital rhythms by means of a sophisticated electronic contraption or to tell your fortune on the basis of your zodiac sign and birth date. You get extremely interesting information on when best to engage in creative work and when to kick up your heels, on whether you should seduce your new girlfriend tonight or take your time about it. More likely than not, you'll be cheated. Human vital rhythms are more complex and varied, and scientists say the key to them should be sought in the periodic table.

The fact that everything about Nature is rhythmical was noted by man ages ago. As he felt the rhythmical influences of the environment upon him, man came to realize that he, too, follows a certain rhythm. These rhythms, however, are not always connected with external factors. There is a certain inner-development rate set by the human system itself.

A science called biorhythmology emerged half a century ago and made rapid progress right from the start.

Altogether, over 300 rhythmical human physiological functions have been discovered, varying in duration from fractions of a second (the biorhythms of the brain) to years (the rhythms of physical growth and development). All of them are interdependent, the most obvious of them being the diurnal rhythms: the alternation of sleep and vigil within 24 hours.

In the course of a day, however, the human organism functions in different "modes." Even a healthy young man's body temperature varies within three percent; pulse rate within 30; blood pressure, 25, and breathing rate, within 10 percent.

Whereas blood pressure fluctuations over 24 hours are easy to detect by means of a sphygmomanometer, other rhythmic changes in the organism taking periods of one to several years – such as the rhythms of growth, creative work and depressions – are hard to trace.

Help me get an electron

You don't have to consult fortune-tellers and clairvoyants to feel that periods of vigorous activity alternate with periods of depression. True, one would like to know when the next period sets in. In principle, the regularity of these rhythms is quite easy to establish by averaging the relative statistics for, say, a hundred persons over a lengthy period. How these rhythms arise, and what their causes are remains unknown. Some scientists believe them to be the organism's reaction to changes in the environment, others see their source in the organism itself. The latter maintain that the interconnection between creative and depressive cycles show in biochemical reactions in the human body.

In our opinion, creative and depressive cycles are determined by a more general fundamental law at work in animate and inanimate worlds and responsible for the emergence of both external and internal factors influencing the organism. This law should manifest itself in the micro- and macro-world simultaneously.

All nature, including the human organism, consists of chemical elements and their combinations. Interactions between them are described by Mendeleyev's periodic law. Human life is probably coded in this law, too.

If the ordinal numbers of chemical elements are substituted by years of a man's life, it will be seen that the duration and frequency of rhythmic periods coincide with the duration and frequency of changes in the properties of chemical elements as their ordinal numbers grow.

Creative cycles coincide with the numbers of chemically low-active elements of the eighth group of the periodic system (noble gases), which have a filled energy level, i.e., a fully occupied electron shell. Depressive periods coincide with the elements of the first group (alkali metals), which have only one electron at the outer energy level.

Chemical elements gradually change their properties as they change over from alkali metals to noble gases and acquire more



The oldest living person: Carrie C. White of Gadsden, Florida, was born on November 18, 1874. An inmate of a home for the aged, she is seen here with her adopted grandchildren. Statistics say that married men stand more chances of living to be a hundred than single men do, but then there are more centenarians among spinsters than among married women. This may also be connected with biological rhythms.

As to diurnal rhythms and the alternation of sleep and vigil, there can be exceptions from the rules here, too. Nadezhda Lebedina from Mogilev village, Dnepropetrovsk Region, holds the world's sleeping record. She fell asleep in 1954, after a quarrel with her husband, and woke up only in 1974.

The longest recorded period for which a person has voluntarily gone without sleep is 453 hours 40 minutes. Robert McDonald of California, who set the record, did not sleep a wink from March 14 to April 2, 1986, sitting in a rocking chair all the while.

Investigations have revealed that man's diurnal rhythms do not depend on the alternation of night and day. Most people reach the peak of their activity by 8-9 in the evening and keep it until 4 a.m.

The graph of human biological rhythms plotted on the basis of the Mendeleyev periodic law. Those pointed are the years of life



electrons in their nuclear shell; in the same way man gradually proceeds from the peak of depression to the peak of his creative activity. A turning point is almost in the middle of the way from depression to the peak of intellectual activity. The properties of chemical elements also change radically when the outer energy level is more than half full of electrons.

A year of maximum intellectual activity is followed by a year of severe depression, whereupon comes a gradual rise. Chemical elements follow a similar pattern. An atom with the fully occupied electron shell is followed, in the period table, by an atom with one electron at the outer level; at all the subsequent levels, the number of electrons grows by one at a time until the electron shell is fully occupied again.

Proceeding from this hypothesis, we have plotted a graph in an attempt to represent man's evolution in the course of his life. The result of our effort – a curve derived from the periodic table – has fully coincided with the conclusions made by the Russian biorhythmologists N. Perna, V. Doskin and S. Ivanov, who determined the time limits and the relative levels of growth, creativeness and depressions for the age groups of 5 to 55.

Live to be a hundred, and you will see

Our diagram has shown that the rhythms of growth, creative and depressive period alternations within a lifetime add up to a complicated and dynamic system with two different types of cycles.

Characteristic of the first two cycles (from birth to the age of 19) is a wave-like physical and somewhat slower intellectual development.

After the age of 20, intellectual growth intensifies and keeps gaining momentum until the age of 25. In the subsequent four years, physical and intellectual progress comes to completion, and independent creative cycles begin since the age of 30.

In even cycles, beginning with the fourth one, the vital activity of the organism and intellectual proficiency are determined by physical rhythms, i.e., by **physical** changes in the organism. During odd cycles, intellectual progress is more rapid than physical growth, and conditions favourable to **intellectual** activity are formed. It is precisely in that period that fate gives one a chance to create, to write, to invent or just to climb up the social ladder. Whether one uses the chance depends on him alone.

A look at the Mendeleyev table will show that the elements which enter into redox reactions, on the whole correspond to the period of intense creative activity. Consequently, one depends on redox reactions, perhaps, for his creative energy.

Too early to retire on pension yet!

A graph plotted on the basis of the periodic table represents all the phases a human life goes through. Within some of these phases, man's physical and mental state has been given a thorough study. Children's mental instability at 10 (as, incidentally, at 18-19) is always a "headache" for parents. This is described in all the books and manuals on child upbringing. Other rhythms are in need of extra study by medical doctors, sociologists and psychologists. "Hazing" in army barracks is a lamentable phenomenon, of course, but it can hardly be coped with by the methods now suggested, even by making the army a professional one. At the age of 19, a person is in a state of depression; in accordance with our theory, all the systems of his organism, the higher nervous system included, undergo functional changes at this age, with some kinds of chemical reactions probably being replaced by others.

Man's state in old age is still to be given an all-round study. Our graph shows that the retirement age set for white-collar workers in Russia is premature. Although the source of inspiration and advancement runs dry by this age, as a rule, expertise and professionalism are retained at a sufficiently high level until the age of 71.

The graph suggests that by the fourth cycle (age 29-30) one is physically and intellectually ripe for independent work. If one still goes to college at this age, he will hardly ever realize his potential. He cannot fully "express himself" in studies because by that age his biological rhythms and his self-awareness urge self-expression and concrete physical or mental effort. What's more, remaining in college till the age of 29-30 will certainly tell upon his subsequent career, because he has failed to create something at the peak of his creative potential. The most rewarding college years are 20-28, when studies coincide with the maximum biological rhythms of one's intellectual advancement.

The curves of our graph warn of another danger yet. If one's intellectual standard goes down by one-third, his intellectual rhythms will coincide with, or even become subordinate to his physiological functions. In that case, a man will not differ much from an animal. Such a drop in standards of intellect may occur as a result of political cataclysms, for instance, caused by a certain moral climate in society. If such a deformation affects a whole section of society rather than one individual, a disaster may ensue.

We have established that man can live to the age of 118. This figure equals the total capacity of electrons at all the energy levels of the period system. The age limits of the cycles differ from person to person, of course, especially those of the last, 12th cycle. Therefore one can even live to be 126. This will hardly make him happy: over the previous eleven cycles, i.e., by the age of 100, his organism will have spent 97 percent of its physical and creative potential. This estimate is confirmed by statistics. Under present-day conditions, only one person out of 2.1 thousand million lives to be 115. Sigechiyo Izumi, a Japanese, set the record of longevity – he lived to the age of 121. Today the average life-span is 70. Over that period, man exhausts up to 85 percent of his physical and up to 74 percent of his intellectual potential.

So it is perhaps for the better that there is no recipe for immortality. But on the other hand, the periods of creative activity are over three times longer than those of depression and of creative crises.

Hustlers spoiling for a fight

The arrival of the UN "blue helmets" triggers battles on the sex market

The deployment of the UN peace-keeping troops in Yugoslavian republics was welcomed not only by European politicians, who had gone all out in trying to put an end to the civil war, and by the war-weary local residents. Representatives of the most ancient profession also looked forward to their arrival.

The ladies, with foreigner-hotel tastes, were the least concerned about the political and humane aspects of the matter. They had their own interests to look after: the stay of 15,000 UN troops in the republics of the former SFRY for a year, or longer, promised them good and lucrative business with quick hard-currency returns.

The well-informed dames had started preparing for the "invasion" long before those in the corridors of power and in the diplomatic circles decided upon it. As the embassies of all countries in Belgrade were still speculating about the date of the peace-keeping forces' arrival, prostitutes already knew it, plus the numerical strength of the contingent and, the most important thing, the places of its deployment. They had reserved hotel rooms in those places long before official word came about the "blue helmets" arrival.

The tactics of relieving soldiers' pockets of hard currency earned in the service of peace was worked out in detail and in good time. Balkan prostitutes even made a deal with their East European colleagues on dividing the "spheres of influence." An unexpected thing happened in the process. The free market thrives on competition. News came that Western "professionals" would come in the wake of the "blue helmets." The reality of the challenge was confirmed by Western prostitutes paying regular visits to the places of the UN forces' future deployment "by way of preliminary reconnoissance."

Russian infantrymen are leaving for Yugoslavia as part of the UN peace-keeping force. Their monthly pay will hardly enable them to afford the services of local prostitutes

All this naturally caused a great deal of anxiety among local and East European hetaerae. All mutual complaints and quarrels were forgotten. Yugoslavian and East European hustlers (the latter including quite a number of our compatriots) decided to present a united front to the uninvited guests so as to prevent what they see as a "gross injustice."

"We have gone through an awful lot here," a Russian beauty who had come over to the Balkans from a small town near Moscow complained to me. "We got caught in skirmishes, in bombing raids, and what not. We never stopped working, of course, but it's not much fun being with a client who never lets go of his tommy gun! And think of all the basements and ruins we had to find shelter in and even spend nights in! I even thought of leaving, but the war had blocked all the ways out. Then I heard the 'blue helmets' were coming, and that gave me a kind of stimulus. Now those Western cows think of grazing on our green pastures. Like hell they will! We'll fight tooth and nail for what belongs to us by right!"

The girl garnished her tirade with Russian slang expressions which do not lend themselves to translation either into English, or into literary Russian.

So the arrival of the "blue helmets" and the end of the civil war may bring another war which, though local in scale, may turn out to be world war of sorts, from the viewpoint of the national composition of the female "troops." The joint forces of Yugoslavian and East European prostitutes are prepared to fight Western interlopers tooth and nail. Instead of their teeth and nails, however, they are not averse to using political pressure of sorts. For example, they demand that hotel owners should keep "guest performers" out. Failure to comply, they threaten, may leave the hotels without any guests at all. After all, it's easy to spread rumours that this or that hotel is in for a terrorist bomb attack, or, easier still, that there are AIDS victims among the members of a hotel's or restaurant's staff.

Those in the know predict that the "sex war" in former Yugoslavia may last for quite a while.

Gennady Sysoyev,
New Times correspondent
BELGRADE

SEE YOU IN TAHITI

Film about the adventures of charming swindlers –

SEE YOU IN TAHITI

Two loving pairs are longing for escape from Russia. Their dream is Tahiti.

They are merrily making money in New Moscow.

Exciting, light & smiling...



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